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TORTIOUS REMEDIES FOR DELIBERATE WRONGDOING 






I   INTRODUCTION 
Human trafficking, the modern day slave trade, is one of the most egregious 
human rights violations. Sadly, trafficking and slavery are perpetrated in 
Australia in the 21st century. People who are trafficked into forced labour or 
sexual servitude are deceived, abused physically and psychologically, frequently 
imprisoned and forced to work long hours with little or no wages, often under the 
most vile and inhuman conditions.  
The true scale of human trafficking and slavery in Australia is not known but 
the Australian Federal Police force (‘AFP’) has established three Human 
Trafficking Teams1 to investigate and combat trafficking in Australia and since 
2004, the AFP has undertaken over 270 investigations of allegations of 
trafficking-related offences.2 Victims are trafficked into Australia, most often 
from Asian countries, for exploitation in many ways including sexual servitude, 
domestic labour and forced labour in the construction, hospitality and agriculture 
industries.3 Victims are lured into the human trafficking trade by deception and 
coercion. They are highly vulnerable because of poverty and their often desperate 
circumstances in their countries of origin. Victims are traumatised and suffer 
physical and psychological injury, in many cases lasting a lifetime. Human 
trafficking, slavery and servitude are grave violations of human rights which are 
perpetrated in Australia, often by Australian citizens. Australia has clear 
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1  Australian Federal Police, Stopping Human Trafficking (2011) <http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/human-
trafficking.aspx>; Australian Federal Police, ‘Annual Report, 2008/09’ (Report, Australian Federal 
Police, 2 September 2009) ch 3; Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Trafficking in Persons: The Australian Government Response 1 May 2009 – 30 June 2010 
(2010) 26. 
2  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 November 2010, 3188–91 
(Brendan O’Connor). 
3  Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, above n 1, 25. 
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obligations pursuant to international law to provide assistance and compensation 
to victims. 
This article considers what tortious remedies in respect of deliberate 
wrongdoing are available to victims of human trafficking and slavery in Australia 
and the difficulties which victims might face in the pursuit of those remedies. 
Causes of action in respect of negligently inflicted harm are not considered 
because the conduct of traffickers and exploiters which causes harm to their 
victims is almost invariably deliberate or at the very least reckless and is 
therefore best redressed by tortious remedies in respect of deliberate wrongdoing. 
The tortious causes of action which would provide suitable remedies for victims 
of trafficking and slavery include the trespass to person, torts of assault, battery 
and false imprisonment as well as the cause of action first identified in Wilkinson 
v Downton4 and the torts of deceit and conspiracy by unlawful means. 
Certainly, tort law offers the prospect of suitable remedies for victims of 
trafficking and slavery in these causes of action but in such cases there are of 
course, many obstacles to any claim by a victim. These obstacles arise from the 
very nature of the cases and from the parlous situations in which victims find 
themselves: isolated from the community, physically and mentally distressed, 
having no money or financial security of any kind, and very fearful of 
incarceration or deportation because of their immigration status, often as 
unlawful non-citizens.5 Further, many victims of trafficking remain unidentified 
or do not have access to legal advice and representation.6 Other obstacles to civil 
suits arise out of the adversarial nature of the civil litigation process, the 
complexity and anonymity of trafficking syndicates, and the apparent lack of 
assets of many perpetrators.  
Ultimately, there is no doubt that tort law has the capacity to provide a 
significant remedy for a victim of trafficking or slavery. Nevertheless, the 
practical advantage of a claim in tort will depend to a great extent on the 
availability of suitable legal representation and on the determination of the victim 
to see the litigation process through to a conclusion. The identification of 
defendants with sufficient assets to meet an award of damages will be crucial. 
Not every victim of trafficking or slavery will be in a position to commence 
and maintain a common law claim, even with the benefit of expert pro bono legal 
advice. Legal advisers to victims need to be mindful not only of appropriate 
causes of action in tort and the evidentiary challenges they might face but also 
the practical difficulties in the prosecution of civil claims by victims. In many 
cases a common law claim will not be the answer. A victim may be better 
advised to pursue a claim under one of the Australian states’ victims of crime 
                                                 
4  [1897] 2 QB 57. 
5  Anne T Gallagher, ‘Prosecuting and Adjudicating Trafficking in Persons Cases in Australia: Obstacles 
and Opportunities’ (Speech delivered at the National Judicial College of Australia Twilight Seminar on 
Human Trafficking, Sydney, 15 June 2009) 
<http://njca.anu.edu.au/Professional%20Development/People%20Trafficking/Gallagher%20Judicial%20
College%20Seminar.pdf>. 
6  Ibid. 
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compensation schemes or pursuant to employment legislation or in the event of a 
criminal prosecution, an application for an order for reparation pursuant to the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).7 The establishment of a federal compensation scheme for 
victims of federal crimes would be a constructive and valuable measure to 
provide a certain pathway to compensation for victims of trafficking and slavery. 
Such a scheme would certainly ensure that Australia meets its international legal 
obligations to victims and would underscore Australia’s commitment to human 
rights. 
The first part of this article considers what constitutes human trafficking and 
slavery and the nature and extent of the problem in Australia as well as the 
Australian legislative response to its international obligations concerning 
trafficking and slavery. There follows a brief overview of available statutory 
avenues for compensation for victims. Part II of the article examines the 
advantages of a claim in tort with discussion of the most appropriate tortious 
causes of action in respect of intentional harm to victims as well as the issue of 
damages, in particular, exemplary damages. Part III of the article then 
investigates the obstacles and difficulties which may be encountered by a victim 
in bringing and maintaining civil proceedings for a claim in tort. 
Before a detailed consideration of the appropriate tortious remedies, it is 
useful to consider the nature and extent of human trafficking and slavery in 
Australia and the legislative framework criminalising these human rights 
breaches, which has been enacted in response to Australia’s international 
obligations. 
 
II   HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY IN AUSTRALIA 
A   Human Trafficking Defined 
Human trafficking, as defined in the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime,8 consists of three elements. The first element is the recruitment, transfer, 
harbouring or receipt of persons. The second element is the control of those 
persons by means of threats or force or abduction or deception or abuse of power 
or vulnerability or the provision of payments or benefits. The third element is the 
exploitation of the victim which includes at a minimum, by prostitution or other 
forms of sexual exploitation or forced labour or other services or slavery (or 
similar practices) or the removal of organs. So, movement of a person, combined 
with control by wrongful means and exploitation of that person amounts to 
human trafficking. 
                                                 
7  Though this is a discretionary matter for the court: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 21B. 
8  Opened for signature 15 November 2000, 2237 UNTS 319 (entered into force 25 December 2003) art 3 
(‘Trafficking Protocol’). 
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Persons who are trafficked to Australia are typically recruited by deceptive 
means in one of several South East Asian countries,9 then transported to Australia 
with passports, airline tickets and visas (many obtained fraudulently) often 
arranged by agents or traffickers located offshore.10 On arrival in Australia in 
custody of local members of the trafficking syndicate (which might be a very 
loose association), victims are required to work without any or adequate 
payment, often under threat or in fear for their own safety and wellbeing or that 
of family members in home countries.11 Most victims to date have been women 
who have been trafficked into the sex industry but increasingly, victims are men 
who are trafficked to work in various industries including construction, 
hospitality and agriculture.12 
 
B   Victims of Human Trafficking and Slavery in Australia 
The true extent of human trafficking and slavery in Australia is not known. 
There is little reliable data either at international or domestic levels. The 2010 
Trafficking in Persons Report, 13 compiled by the US Department of State, marks 
the 10th anniversary of the United Nations adoption of the Trafficking Protocol.14 
The State Department report estimates that there are 12.3 million adults and 
children in forced labour, bonded labour, and forced prostitution around the 
world with 56 per cent of these victims being women and girls. The report further 
estimates that the annual trade in people trafficking is worth $US 32 billion.15 
In Australia between January 2004 and June 2010 the AFP conducted more 
than 270 investigations and assessments of human trafficking related offences 
leading to 39 cases being referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions.16 The majority of these cases related to sexual servitude but a 
number involved labour exploitation.17 These figures would represent only a 
proportion of actual cases of human trafficking in Australia, which, like other 
crimes against the person, would doubtless be significantly under-reported.18 The 
circumstances of victims of trafficking and slavery make it especially likely that 
                                                 
9  Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, above n 1, 12. 
10  Andreas Schloenhardt, Genevieve Beirne and Tony Corsbie, ‘Human Trafficking and Sexual Servitude in 
Australia’ (2009) 32 University of New South Wales Law Journal 27, 33. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, above n 1, 25. See also Fiona David, ‘Labour 
Trafficking’ (Report No 108, Australian Institute of Criminology Research and Public Policy Series, 
2010) 15. 
13  Department of State (US), ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’ (Report, Department of State (US), 2010) 
<http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2010>. 
14  Trafficking Protocol annex II. 
15  See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Global Report on Trafficking in Persons’ (Report, 
United Nations, February 2009) <http://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf>. 
16  Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, above n 1, 25. 
17  Ibid; Frances Simmons and Jennifer Burn, ‘Evaluating Australia’s Response to All Forms of Trafficking: 
Towards Rights-Centred Reform’ (2010) 84 Australian Law Journal 712, 713–4. 
18  Janet Phillips and Malcolm Park, ‘Measuring Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault against Women: A 
Review of the Literature and Statistics’ (E-Brief, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2004); 
David, ‘Labour Trafficking’, above n 12, 15. 
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they would be unknown to authorities and very reluctant to report their 
circumstances themselves. They are generally isolated from the community, most 
have limited English language ability and are very often fearful of authorities.  
 
C   Australia’s Criminal Law Framework 
Whilst slave trading has been a criminal offence in Australia since when the 
Slave Trade Act 1824 (UK) 5 Geo 4, c 113 was enacted by the English 
Parliament,19 the Australian government recognised the growing problem of 
contemporary human trafficking in 1999 and in accordance with its international 
law obligations,20 enacted legislation to criminalise human trafficking and 
modern day slavery in Australia. 
Human trafficking (in persons and children),21 domestic trafficking (in 
persons and children),22 slavery,23 and related offences of sexual servitude,24 
deceptive recruiting for sexual services25 and debt bondage26 are all crimes 
pursuant to schedule 1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code’). 
The offence of trafficking in persons consists of the organisation or facilitation of 
the entry or receipt of a person into Australia through the use of force or threats27 
or deception28 to obtain the victim’s compliance. It is an offence to deceive a 
person about the fact that, on entering Australia, they will be required to provide 
sexual services, or exploited or subject to debt bondage or that their identity or 
travel documents will be confiscated.29 Exploitation is defined to include forced 
labour, slavery, sexual servitude and organ removal.30 Maximum penalties for 
these offences range from seven to 25 years in prison.31 
Slavery is defined in section 270.1 of the Criminal Code as ‘the condition of 
a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised, including where such a condition results from a debt or contract 
made by the person’. This provision was considered and interpreted by the High 
Court of Australia in 2008 in the case of R v Tang.32 Wei Tang had been 
                                                 
19  The Imperial Slave Trade Enactments included An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade 1807 (UK) 47 
Geo 3, c 36; Slave Trade Act 1824 (UK) 5 Geo 4, c 113; Slave Trade Act 1843 (UK) 6 & 7 Vict, c 98; and 
Slave Trade Act 1873 (UK) 36 & 37 Vict, c 88. 
20  See below Part I(D) – Australia’s International Obligations. 
21  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 271.1–271.4 (‘Criminal Code’). 
22  Criminal Code ss 271.5, 271.7. 
23  Criminal Code s 270.2. 
24  Criminal Code s 270.6. 
25  Criminal Code s 270.7. 
26  Criminal Code s 271.8. 
27  Criminal Code s 271.2(1). 
28  Criminal Code ss 271.2(2), 271.2(2B). 
29  Criminal Code s 271.2(2A). 
30  Criminal Code Dictionary. 
31  Criminal Code s 270.7(1) (inducing a person to enter into an engagement where they are deceived about 
providing sexual services) and s 270.3(1) (possess or exercise right of control over a slave) respectively. 
For a discussion of all the relevant provisions, see Bernadette McSherry, ‘Trafficking in Persons: A 
Critical Analysis of the New Criminal Code Offences’ (2007) 18 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 385. 
32  (2008) 237 CLR 1 (‘Tang’). 
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convicted of a slavery offence because she required five Thai women to work in 
her brothel without payment until they had each repaid a very substantial ‘debt’, 
effectively being the costs of having them trafficked to Australia. The High Court 
identified various powers attaching to the right of ‘ownership’. Those were the 
power to use a person’s labour in an unrestricted manner; to buy and sell a 
person; to control and restrict a person’s movement; and entitlement to a person’s 
labour without payment commensurate with the value of the labour.33 The Court 
concluded that the nature and extent of the powers exercised by the defendant in 
the Tang case did amount to slavery.34 The Court referred to the 
‘commodification’35 of the victims in that case and the ‘exercise of powers of 
control over movement which extend[ed] well beyond … the most exploitative of 
employment circumstances, as well as the absence or extreme inadequacy of 
payment for services’.36 The High Court’s interpretation of the slavery provisions 
in the Criminal Code is relatively broad and flexible as it allows a consideration 
of the totality of the powers of ownership exercised over a victim without the 
requirement of any single or prescribed set of universal identifiers of 
enslavement.37 
 
D   Australia’s International Obligations 
The Australian criminal legislation concerning human trafficking and slavery 
is the direct response to the Australian government’s international obligations 
pursuant to the Trafficking Protocol and other UN conventions including the 
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery,38 the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery 1956,39 the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights40 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.41 All these 
prohibit slavery and servitude. Australia also has obligations pursuant to the 
International Labour Organisation Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory 
Labour. 42 
Pursuant to these international human rights treaties, Australia has an 
obligation to ensure effective remedies for victims of human trafficking and 
slavery in order to compensate them for harm suffered as a result of their 
                                                 
33  Ibid 17–9 (Gleeson CJ). 
34  Ibid 25 (Gleeson CJ). 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid 24 (Gleeson CJ). 
37  For a discussion of the case, see Jean Allain, ‘R v Tang: Clarifying the Definition of Slavery in 
International Law’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 246; Irina Kolodizner, ‘R v Tang: 
Developing an Australian Anti-Slavery Jurisprudence’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 487. 
38  Opened for signature 25 September 1926, 212 UNTS 17 (entered into force 9 March 1927). 
39  Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, opened for signature 7 September 1956, 226 UNTS 3 (entered into force 30 April 
1957).  
40  GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948).  
41  Opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).  
42  Opened for signature 28 June 1930, 39 UNTS 55 (entered into force 1 May 1932). 
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experiences.43 The United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power states that victims of crime have the right 
to timely redress for harm suffered.44 The Trafficking Protocol itself requires 
states to ensure that their domestic legal systems offer victims the possibility of 
obtaining compensation45 but does not stipulate how compensation is to be 
provided or from what source. The United Nations Working Group on 
Trafficking in Persons has suggested that various types of recovery action might 
meet the requirements of the Trafficking Protocol.46 These include enabling 
victims to sue under statute or common law for civil damages; allowing criminal 
courts to make orders for restitution; and establishing victims’ compensation 
schemes funded by the state.47  
 
E   Statutory Compensation Options for Trafficking  
or Slavery Victims in Australia 
Recourse to compensation by victims of human trafficking and slavery in 
Australia to date has been relatively rare.48 This is because the Australian 
government’s response to its international obligations has been focused on 
prevention, detection, investigation and criminal prosecution of perpetrators.49 
Whilst the Australian government has instigated and financed a support program 
                                                 
43  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 2(3) provides that where a person’s rights have been 
violated, that person has a right to an ‘effective remedy’ including where appropriate, compensation: 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (29 March 
2004) [15]–[16]. 
44  GA Res 40/34, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 40th sess, 96th plen mtg, Agenda Item 98 (29 November 1985). 
45  Trafficking Protocol annex II, art 6.6. 
46  United Nations Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Report on the Meeting of the Working Group 
on Trafficking in Persons Held in Vienna on 19 October 2010, UN Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2010/CRP.1 
(30 March 2011).  
47  The United States of America (‘US’) has created a special civil right of action for victims of trafficking: 
18 USC § 1595. See Jennifer S Nam, ‘The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of 
Action for Human Trafficking Victims’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 1655. 
48  See below fns 51, 52. Compensation claims are more common in the US where various avenues are open 
to victims: Daniel Werner and Kathleen Kim, Civil Litigation on Behalf of Victims of Human Trafficking 
(Southern Poverty Law Center, 3rd ed, 2008). See also the general discussion in Note, ‘Remedying the 
Injustices of Human Trafficking through Tort Law’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 2574. The position 
in the United Kingdom is discussed in Janice Lam and Klara Skrivankova, ‘Opportunities and Obstacles: 
Ensuring Access to Compensation for Trafficked Persons in the UK’ (Report, Anti-Slavery International, 
October 2008). 
49  Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, above n 1. 
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for victims,50 the issue of compensation has not been at the forefront of its 
efforts. 
In Australia, there is no government funded national scheme of compensation 
for victims of crime at the federal level and none is proposed, though it has been 
suggested from various quarters.51 Any claim for compensation against a victim 
of crime compensation scheme must be made pursuant to one of the numerous 
state or territory schemes.52 In NSW and Victoria there have been to date, only 
two cases of trafficking victims making successful claims under the statutory 
criminal victims’ compensation scheme,53 though there are several cases which 
have now been commenced in those states and are awaiting resolution.54 Such 
claims by trafficking victims against state criminal injuries compensation 
schemes will no doubt become more numerous in the future, at least in cases 
which can be brought within the state statutory parameters. Given that the crimes 
of human trafficking and slavery are such gross violations of human rights 
committed within Australia, a federal compensation scheme making specific 
provision for victims would be desirable and in compliance with Australia’s 
international obligations to victims.55 Funding for such a scheme might be 
sourced at least in part, from proceeds of crime funds confiscated by the 
Commonwealth pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) which 
establishes a scheme to trace, restrain and confiscate proceeds of Commonwealth 
                                                 
50  Australian Government, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs, Anti-People Trafficking Strategy (6 January 2011) 
<http://www.fahcsia.gov.au/sa/women/progserv/violence/Pages/AntiPeopleTraffickingStrategy.aspx>. 
The Australian government’s Support Program for Victims of Trafficking provides accommodation, 
financial assistance and access to legal advice for trafficked persons. The Australian Red Cross 
administers the program together with the Office for Women: Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Trafficking in Persons: The Australian Government Response 
January 2004 – April 2009 (2009) 29. 
51  Anti-Slavery Project, Strengthening Australia’s Response to Human Trafficking: Report to the Australian 
Women’s Coalition (2010) 30; Law Council of Australia, Submission to Attorney-General’s Department, 
Australian Government, Consultation on the Criminal Justice Response to Slavery and People 
Trafficking; Reparation and Vulnerable Witness Protections, 30 March 2011. See also Frances Simmons, 
‘The Criminal Justice Response to Trafficking and Reparations: Pathways To Justice for Trafficked 
People’ (Paper presented at Forced Labour Seminar, Anti Slavery Project, University of Technology, 
Sydney, 18 February 2011) <http://www.antislavery.org.au/newsflash/158-the-criminal-justice-response-
to-trafficking-and-reparations.html>. 
52  Victims of Crime (Financial Assistance) Act 1983 (ACT); Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 
(NSW); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld); Victims 
of Crime Act 2001 (SA); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1976 (Tas); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 
1996 (Vic); Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA).  
53  In May 2007, The Age reported that a ’former child sex slave has become the first person in Australia to 
be compensated as a victim of sex trafficking’: Natalie Craig, ‘Sex Slave Victim Wins Abuse Claim’, The 
Age (Melbourne), 29 May 2007, 4. The award of compensation made by the NSW Victims Compensation 
Tribunal was not in respect of a trafficking offence but rather because the young woman was a victim of 
sexual assault with a minor, a state criminal offence. In Victoria in 2010 a trafficked woman was awarded 
almost $30 000 under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic): see Simmons, above n 51. 
54  Associate Professor Jennifer Burn, Director of the Anti Slavery Project at the University of Technology, 
Sydney, who provides legal advice and representation to victims, advised the author that there are several 
cases awaiting resolution in 2010–11 in the NSW Victims Compensation Tribunal. 
55  Anti Slavery Project, above n 51, recommendation 3, 39. 
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crime. These funds have been used to finance various projects to assist victims of 
crime,56 but the Act does not at present allow for confiscated proceeds of crime to 
be used to compensate victims.  
Pursuant to section 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), if a person is 
convicted of a federal offence the court may in addition to any penalty imposed 
on the offender, order that the offender make reparation to any person in respect 
of any loss suffered as a direct result of the offence. The order for reparation is to 
be treated as a final judgment of the court and is enforceable accordingly. To date 
no such order has been made in relation to a trafficking or slavery offence.57 The 
power to order reparation is discretionary and as the court may take into account 
the defendant’s financial situation,58 an order may not reflect the victim’s actual 
loss. Further, section 21B does not explicitly provide for reparation orders to 
include non-economic loss such as pain and suffering or loss of amenity of life 
though it has been suggested that there is an implicit inclusion of such injury in 
the term ‘loss suffered’.59 The Australian Attorney General has recently called 
for submissions in response to a discussion paper which addresses, amongst other 
issues, the question of whether section 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
adequately provides for reparation orders to be made for victims of people 
trafficking.60 
There is scope within the Australian industrial legislation, the Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth) for victims of labour exploitation to recover unpaid wages from a 
perpetrator, notwithstanding that their immigration status may be irregular.61 The 
Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman undertakes investigations and assists 
workers to recover unpaid entitlements.62 The Fair Work Ombudsman undertook 
more than 800 such investigations involving foreign workers (some of whom 
would certainly have been trafficking victims, though there is no statistic) in 
2009–10. More than $500 000 in unpaid entitlements was recovered and repaid.63 
In addition, there has been at least one successful prosecution by Fair Work 
                                                 
56  Attorney-General’s Department, Overview of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (20 September 2011) 
<http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/ncphome.nsf/Page/POCA_funding_for_Non-
Government_Agencies>. 
57  Simmons, above n 51. 
58  Vlahov v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 26 ATR 49. 
59  Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), ‘The Criminal Justice Response to Slavery and People Trafficking: 
Reparation; and Vulnerable Witness Protections’ (Discussion Paper, Australian Government, 25 
November 2010) 21–4 (‘Criminal Justice Reponse to Slavery and People Trafficking’).  
60  Ibid. See also Law Council of Australia, above n 51. 
61  Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) pts 2-2, 4-1. 
62  Anti-People Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, above n 1, 18.  
63  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 November 2010, 3188–91 
(Brendan O’Connor). 
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Australia in a case of extreme labour exploitation in circumstances where a 
trafficking or slavery conviction was not able to be obtained at criminal law.64  
In addition to these statutory avenues of compensation, a victim will have a 
remedy under the common law of tort, which in appropriate cases will have some 
significant advantages over those other remedies.  
 
III   TORTIOUS REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING 
AND SLAVERY IN AUSTRALIA 
A   Advantages of a Claim in Tort 
There is no doubt that a trafficking or slavery victim will face some 
significant hurdles to a claim in tort. These arise by virtue of the very nature of a 
common law claim in the adversarial system, which will almost inevitably lead to 
cross-examination of the victim. In many cases victims will wish to avoid the 
discomfort of a civil trial involving facing their traffickers and perhaps even re-
traumatisation.65 A plaintiff needs to be steeled to see the often lengthy civil 
litigation process through to a conclusion. Other procedural and practical 
obstacles to a claim in tort are discussed in Part III below. 
Yet, there are distinct advantages of a claim in tort. Tort law offers a remedy 
in damages which are significant and which have an incalculable vindicating 
effect for the individual plaintiff.66 Tortious damages offer the possibility of an 
award which would be significantly larger than the maximum sums available 
pursuant to statutory compensation schemes.67 Tort law provides justice for a 
victim and punishment at least financially, of a perpetrator, especially in cases 
where no criminal prosecution has been brought by federal police or where it 
may have been unsuccessful because of evidentiary or other difficulties. The 
possibility of an award of aggravated or exemplary damages against a defendant 
provides not only vindication and retribution but also must have some deterrent 
effect.68  
Additionally, an apology might be considered. Whilst the common law courts 
do not have the power to order an apology, one might be given on settlement of a 
claim. There is growing recognition of the value of an apology in civil 
proceedings especially where the plaintiff has suffered injury to dignity and 
                                                 
64  In the case of R v Yogalingam Rasalingam (Unreported, District Court of New South Wales, Puckeridge 
DCJ, 2 November 2007), the defendant was acquitted by a jury of a trafficking in persons charge, though 
he was convicted of a lesser charge of misleading a Commonwealth official in the immigration process. 
In Fryer v Yoga Tandoori House Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 288 (13 March 2008), the defendant’s company 
was ordered to pay a penalty in respect of 10 breaches of the relevant award. 
65  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Criminal Justice Response to Slavery and People Trafficking’, above n 
59, 11. 
66  For a discussion of vindication and tortious damages generally, see Normann Witzleb and Robyn Carroll, 
‘The Role of Vindication in Torts Damages’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 16. 
67  Ian Freckelton, Criminal Injuries Compensation: Law, Practice and Policy (LBC Information Services, 
2001). 
68  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118. 
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violation of human rights.69 At common law, admissions of regret or apologies 
will not necessarily constitute admissions of liability.70 Parliaments clearly 
acknowledge the worth of an apology as one in a suite of remedies available in 
various kinds of civil proceedings71 and in most Australian jurisdictions an 
apology in a negligence claim will not be admissible as an admission of 
liability.72  
The law of tort has shown itself to be particularly adept at evolving to 
accommodate changing social demands and emerging notions of justice. Indeed 
McHugh J has lauded the ‘genius of the common law’ whereby ‘principles are 
modified and expanded by the pressure of changing social conditions and the 
experience of their practical application in the life of the community’.73 The 
tortious causes of action discussed below would in the main, accommodate a 
claim by a victim of trafficking or slavery without the need for extension of 
existing common law principles. In a case where some extension or modification 
of existing law would be warranted to do justice to a claim, the common law 
certainly has that capacity. 
To date there have been no reported cases of trafficked persons successfully 
seeking tortious damages at common law in Australia, though there have now 
been isolated successful cases in England.74  
There are several tortious causes of action at common law which would be 
available to victims of trafficking and slavery in Australia, depending on the 
circumstances of their cases. Clearly in many cases, victims will have been 
subjected to physical threats and abuse which would give rise to claims in tort for 
assault and battery and of course, in many instances victims will have been 
falsely imprisoned. Other tortious causes of action which might be considered are 
the action on the case in Wilkinson v Downton75 in respect of psychiatric injury 
and the torts of deceit and conspiracy by unlawful means. These various causes 
of action would allow recovery of damages for personal injury where appropriate 
                                                 
69  Prue Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability 
Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space: The Journal of Law and Social Justice 3 
<http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/publicspace/article/viewFile/535/482>; Robyn Carroll, ‘You 
Can’t Order Sorriness, So Is There Any Value in an Ordered Apology? An Analysis of Ordered 
Apologies in Anti-Discrimination Cases’ (2010) 33 University of New South Wales Law Journal 360; 
Craig Brown, ‘Apology Legislation: Oiling the Wheels of Tort’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 127; Chris 
Wheeler, ‘The Power of Sorry’ (Paper presented at the Local Government Governance Gathering, 
Sydney, 16 February 2011). 
70  Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 215 CLR 317. 
71  By way of examples, apology orders are available pursuant to: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 
108(2)(d); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 209(1); Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23 
(in federal anti-discrimination cases); Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 
55(2)(e). 
72  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 69; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 72; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) 
s 75; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 7; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 14J; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) 
s 5AH; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 14; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 
(NT) s 13.  
73  Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, 585 (McHugh J). 
74  AT v Dulghieru [2009] EWHC 225 (QB). 
75  [1897] 2 QB 57. 
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as well as for financial losses and property damage. In some instances aggravated 
and exemplary damages may be available especially given that human trafficking 
and slavery and are such gross violations of human rights.  
The following part of this article considers the most appropriate tortious 
common law actions which would be available to victims of trafficking and 
slavery in Australia and the types of damages which might be recoverable.  
 
B   Trespass to Person – Assault and Battery 
In many trafficking and slavery cases victims would have actionable tort 
claims against the perpetrators in trespass to person for assault or battery (which 
in many cases will be sexual battery). There have been criminal and employment 
law prosecutions in Australian trafficking cases where proven facts clearly 
demonstrate the elements of the torts of battery or assault.76 The victims could 
have succeeded in civil claims in tort had they had the opportunity and means to 
commence and maintain proceedings. Of course, such tortious claims are only 
practically worthwhile in cases where the defendants have the means to satisfy 
any award of damages, though in several of the cases mentioned above, the 
defendants clearly had businesses or assets which should have been available to 
satisfy a judgment.77  
To succeed in a claim for battery a plaintiff need simply prove an intentional 
act by the defendant, which directly causes a contact with the plaintiff’s body.78 
In the 2010 Queensland case of R v Kovacs79 where the defendant husband and 
wife were convicted (at a re-trial following a successful appeal) of using and 
possessing a slave,80 the victim was a woman who had been brought to Australia 
by the defendants by way of a sham marriage. She was required to work at the 
defendants’ home and in their business without payment, being effectively 
imprisoned. The original trial court had heard evidence that the male defendant 
had repeatedly sexually assaulted the victim.81 Clearly a claim at common law in 
battery would be maintainable by the victim, as would a claim in false 
imprisonment. 
A tortious assault is constituted by an intentional act by a defendant, which 
directly causes an apprehension of imminent physical contact by the plaintiff. 82 
A victim of slavery and trafficking will often have been subjected to threatening 
conduct or words, which would amount to tortious assaults. The case of R v 
                                                 
76  R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51; Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1; R v McIvor [2010] NSWDC 310 (17 December 
2010); R v Dobie (Unreported, Queensland District Court, Clare J, 18 December 2008) (unsuccessful 
appeals [2009] QCA 394 (18 December 2009), [2010] QCA 34 (26 February 2010)). 
77  R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51; Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1; R v McIvor [2010] NSWDC 310 (17 December 
2010). 
78  Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (1992) 175 CLR 218. 
79  R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51. 
80  Zoltan Kovacs entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced in the Queensland District Court on 18 
February 2010 and Melita Kovacs was convicted by a jury after a re-trial in the Queensland District Court 
on 14 February 2010. 
81  R v Kovacs [2009] 2 Qd R 51, 62–3. 
82  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 644 (Gleeson CJ). 
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McIvor83 provides a useful example. There, the defendants were convicted of 
possessing and using slaves. They had brought five Thai women to Australia, 
with the assistance of an agent in Thailand. The women were required to work in 
brothels to pay off ‘debts’ of between AUD $35 000 and $45 000. The 
sentencing judgment records that the victims were kept in confinement at the 
defendants’ premises or at the brothels at which they worked. Some victims were 
subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment by the defendants and were 
subjected to threats that they, or their families in Thailand, would be harmed if 
they escaped.84 Claims in tort for false imprisonment (discussed below) and 
assault and battery would be appropriate in these cases.  
The plaintiff in an assault claim must establish that the defendant’s threat 
caused a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical contact.85 For the victims 
in the McIvor case, and for others in similar situations, this issue is one which 
must be carefully addressed. The threats in the McIvor case do not seem to have 
been couched in ‘immediate’ terms. Rather the threat is of unspecified danger or 
ill treatment of the victim at some uncertain point in the future. There is however 
Australian authority to the effect that a threat which will be carried out at some 
unknown future time may nevertheless be a threat of imminent contact where the 
plaintiff has no way of knowing how closely in time or where the threat might be 
carried out.86 In Zanker v Vartzokas, White J opined that there would be an 
assault where: 
fear was a continuing fear induced by [the] original words in a situation where [the 
defendant] remained in a position of dominance and in a position to carry out the 
threatened violence at some time not too remote, thus keeping the apprehension, 
the gist of the assault, ever present in the victims mind.87 
This characterisation of the nature and effect of the threat required to ground 
an assault claim, is a useful one in a trafficking or slavery case. There, the threat 
once made, or repeated intermittently, has a continuing effect on the victim who 
remains in fear of personal injury, in the event of an attempt to leave the 
defendant’s premises or general control. 
The threats made in these situations are usually conditional in the sense that 
the victim is told that the threat will be carried out if he or she runs away or tells 
anyone of the exploitative situation, the inference being that if the plaintiff is 
compliant there is no likelihood of injury. There is ample authority to the effect 
that conditional threats are nevertheless capable of being assaults.88 
 
C   False Imprisonment 
To succeed in an action in the tort of false imprisonment, a plaintiff must 
prove total deprivation of liberty directly brought about by intentional actions of 
                                                 
83  [2010] NSWDC 310 (17 December 2010) (‘McIvor’). 
84  Ibid [20], [22], [26], [33] (Williams DCJ). 
85  Stephens v Myers (1830) 172 ER 735; Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98. 
86  Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11. 
87  Ibid 18. 
88  Rozsa v Samuels [1969] SASR 205; Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850. 
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the defendant.89 Because it is one of the trespass to person torts (like assault and 
battery), false imprisonment is actionable without proof of any actual damage.90 
This aspect distinguishes the trespass torts from the actions on the case discussed 
below or negligence, which require proof of damage as an element of the torts. 
The tort of false imprisonment will provide a remedy for most victims of 
trafficking or slavery because some degree of restriction of freedom of 
movement is almost universally imposed on victims by traffickers or those who 
enslave.91 Where the degree of restriction of movement can be shown to be total, 
the victim will have a remedy in the tort of false imprisonment. 
Some victims of human trafficking and slavery may be literally imprisoned 
and kept under lock and key for varying periods of time by those who traffic or 
exploit them. But many victims may be less obviously held captive by those who 
exploit them, who may use more subtle means of control. The victim is however, 
arguably, no less incarcerated. The modern tort of false imprisonment92 should 
provide a remedy in these situations where the imprisonment is not physical but 
psychological. In such cases the victim succumbs entirely to the power and 
authority of the exploiter by virtue of fear of apprehension by authorities or of 
deportation or of some unspecified consequences that might befall the victim or 
family members in a country of origin.93  
In the case of Tang,94 the High Court referred to the findings of fact of the 
trial judge as to the circumstances in which the five female victims of Wei Tang 
were confined to the premises of the defendant: 
The complainants' passports and return airfares were retained by the respondent. 
This was done so that the passports could be produced to immigration authorities if 
necessary, and also so that the complainants could not run away. The complainants 
lived in premises arranged by the respondent, where they were lodged and fed, and 
their medical requirements attended to. The evidence was that the complainants 
were well-provisioned, fed, and provided for. The complainants were not kept under 
lock and key. Nevertheless, the trial judge said that, in the totality of the 
circumstances, the complainants were effectively restricted to the premises. On rare 
occasions they ventured out with consent or under supervision. The circumstances to 
which the trial judge referred included the hours of work involved, as well as control 
by way of fear of detection from immigration authorities, fear of visa offences, 
advice to be aware of immigration authorities, advice to tell false stories to 
immigration authorities if apprehended, and instructions not to leave their 
accommodation without the respondent, DS or the manager of the brothel.95 
                                                 
89  Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742. 
90  Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988] 1 WLR 692, 703 (Griffith LJ); Myer Stores Ltd v Soo [1991] 2 VR 
597, 633 (Murphy J). See also David Howarth, ‘Trespass and Intentional Interference with the Person’ in 
Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook, 10th ed, 2011) ch 2. 
91  Schloenhardt, Beirne and Corsbie, above n 10. 
92  Francis A Trindade, ‘The Modern Tort of False Imprisonment’ in Nicholas J Mullany (ed), Tort in the 
Nineties (Lawbook, 1997) 229.  
93  Threats of force to persons other than the plaintiff or to property have been held to be sufficient for 
criminal false imprisonment: R v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392, 402 (King CJ), 405 (Von Doussa J). See 
also the Canadian decision in Chaytor v London, New York & Paris Association of Fashion Ltd (1961) 30 
DLR (2d) 527 where the court referred to a “psychological type of imprisonment”. 
94  (2008) 237 CLR 1. 
95  Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1, 14–15 (Gleeson CJ).  
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It is submitted that these circumstances would constitute the tort of false 
imprisonment. In McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy 
Union96 the Victorian Court of Appeal observed that: 
Although the idea of false imprisonment is sometimes expressed in terms of a 
restriction on liberty which must be total that does not mean that a restriction short 
of lock and key may not be actionable. In each case, it is a question of fact as to 
whether a restriction is so severe as to be characterised as false imprisonment.97 
There is significant authority to support the assertion that where, in the 
absence of any physical restriction on movement, a person wholly submits to the 
authority and control of another, that will amount to imprisonment.98 In Watson v 
Marshall for example, the High Court exercising original jurisdiction, found: 
the plaintiff had a justified apprehension that, if he did not submit to do what was 
asked of him, he would be compelled by force to go [with the defendant] ... 
Therefore a restraint was imposed upon the plaintiff which amounted to an 
‘imprisonment’ of him by the defendant.99 
Similarly, in Symes v Mahon,100 Murray CJ of South Australia held that 
‘where there has been no application of physical force to the person alleging 
imprisonment, there must be evidence of complete submission by him to the 
control of the other party’.101 
This aspect of the tort of false imprisonment was dealt with at some length by 
the Victorian Court of Appeal in McFadzean.102 This was a case concerned with 
the question of whether a group of ‘anti-logging’ protesters were imprisoned in a 
forest by the intimidating actions of a group of ‘pro-logging’ workers. Ultimately, 
the Court held that the plaintiffs had not been falsely imprisoned because they had 
a reasonable means of egress by a physically difficult but in the circumstances, not 
unreasonable, walk out of the forest. Importantly the Court held that the plaintiffs 
had remained in the forest not primarily because of the defendants’ actions but 
rather because the plaintiffs had their own reasons for remaining at the site, 
independent of the defendants’ conduct. The Court held that: 
it remains that the essence of the action of false imprisonment is the compelling of a 
person to stay at a particular place against his or her will. Accordingly, where a 
plaintiff has full knowledge and comprehension of the defendant’s coercive conduct 
amounting to total restraint, the action depends upon proof that, were it not for the 
defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have submitted to the restraint. 
Consequently, it is not sufficient in law that conduct of the defendant have [sic] 
contributed to or influenced the plaintiff’s decision to remain unless the conduct has 
overborne the plaintiff’s will. It must be shown that, but for the defendant’s conduct, 
the plaintiff would not have yielded to the total restraint; that the plaintiffs’ 
determination to remain was a coercive consequence of the defendant’s acts.103 
                                                 
96  (2007) 20 VR 250 (‘McFadzean’).  
97  Ibid 264 (Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA). 
98  Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621; Symes v Mahon [1922] SASR 447. 
99  Watson v Marshall (1971) 124 CLR 621, 626 (Walsh J). 
100  [1922] SASR 447. 
101  Ibid 453. 
102  (2007) 20 VR 250. 
103  (2007) 20 VR 250, 264 (Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA). 
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This analysis is especially relevant to the case of a victim of trafficking or 
slavery who is not physically imprisoned but who remains in the custody of 
traffickers or exploiters because of fear of apprehension by authorities or of 
unspecified repercussions for overseas family or simply because she or he has 
been made to feel overwhelmingly alienated and isolated from the outside world. 
It is submitted that all these reasons are the result of the conduct of the trafficker: 
that the victim remains as a ‘coercive consequence’ of the trafficker’s actions. 
The victim of trafficking has no truly independent personal reason for remaining 
in the custody of a trafficker. Accordingly, the tort of false imprisonment should 
provide a remedy. 
Returning to the description of the plight of the victims in the Tang case 
discussed above,104 and the finding of the trial judge that ‘in the totality of the 
circumstances, the complainants were effectively restricted to the premises’,105 it 
is clear that the plaintiffs could prove the elements of the tort of false 
imprisonment. They would need to identify and prove the specific actions of the 
defendant trafficker or her agent, being threats or words or actions, which 
directly resulted in the plaintiffs’ total submission to the will of the defendant. 
For Wei Tang’s victims, those actions would be the withholding of passports, air 
fares, identification and personal documents; control by way of fear of detection 
from immigration authorities; fear of visa offences; instructions not to leave the 
premises without a representative of the defendant; and constant supervision. The 
plaintiffs would be able to demonstrate that their restriction to the premises was a 
direct ‘coercive consequence’ of the defendants’ actions, in the sense that they 
had no reason to remain other than their complete submission to the will of the 
defendant, brought about entirely by the actions of the defendant. It is notable 
here that the Court in McFadzean made the following observation: 
It is important to keep in view the ultimate concern of the tort of false 
imprisonment, namely, protection against the unlawful total restraint on the liberty 
and freedom of movement of the plaintiff. In the end, it is a matter of degree in all 
the prevailing circumstances.106 
For a victim of trafficking or slavery, the argument is simply that in all the 
prevailing circumstances, the degree of control exercised by the trafficker or 
enslaver amounts to imprisonment: a deliberate and direct total deprivation of the 
liberty of the victim. Interestingly, there are instances in the US where the courts 
have taken a fairly broad approach on the question of what will constitute 
imprisonment in a trafficking context.107 In one case it was held that a plaintiff 
had properly pleaded a claim in false imprisonment where for a period she had 
even had a key to the premises in which she lived whilst her traffickers were out 
of the country. It was held that the defendants’ threats of arrest and prosecution 
and the plaintiff’s fear of the defendants effectively imprisoned her during that 
                                                 
104  Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1, 14-5 (Gleeson C.J).  
105  Ibid 14. 
106  (2007) 20 VR 250, 273 (Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA). 
107  Zavala v Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 393 F Supp 2d 295, 334–5 (D NJ, 2006); Chellen v John Pickle Co, 446 F 
Supp 2d 1247, 1274–5 (ND Okla, 2006). 
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time.108 Arguably this interpretation would be acceptable in Australia as within 
the parameters suggested in the McFadzean case. 
 
D   Action on the Case for Intentional Infliction of Psychiatric Injury 
The cause of action in Wilkinson v Downton109 is uniquely suited to provide a 
remedy for victims of trafficking and slavery in circumstances where a defendant 
has used threatening and intimidating behaviour and words toward the victim. 
This conduct may fall short of actual assault or battery but may cause the victim 
psychiatric injury, often in the form of post traumatic stress disorder. Conduct of 
a defendant such as veiled threats of injury or disadvantage to members of the 
victim’s family or as to the kind of treatment a victim might experience at the 
hands of immigration or police authorities, may not necessarily amount to the tort 
of assault but are clearly calculated to frighten and intimidate the victim and 
would have the obvious capacity to cause mental harm to a victim. Such 
behaviour would come squarely within the scope of liability under Wilkinson v 
Downton and would satisfy the elements of the action. Damages recoverable 
would include compensatory damages and, in appropriate cases, aggravated and 
exemplary damages.110  
In Wilkinson v Downton, the defendant falsely represented to the plaintiff that 
her husband had been involved in a serious accident. This was meant to be a 
practical joke. As a result of this statement the plaintiff suffered what was then 
termed ‘nervous shock’. Despite finding there was no precedent for this action, 
Wright J held that damages should be awarded on the ground that: 
The defendant has … wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the 
plaintiff … and has in fact caused physical harm to her. That proposition without 
more appears to me to state a good cause of action, there being no justification 
alleged for the act. 111 
So there are three elements to the cause of action, namely: a wilful act by the 
defendant; which is calculated to cause harm; and which does in fact cause harm 
to the plaintiff, the harm being a psychiatric injury. 
The cause of action in Wilkinson v Downton has been used in recent years in 
Australia in a variety of situations to provide remedies to plaintiffs who have 
suffered psychiatric injury as a result of threatening or confronting behaviour or 
words by a defendant. These situations have included a claim for workplace 
humiliation and harassment112 and a claim by protesters following intimidating 
                                                 
108  Deressa v Gobena (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 13 February 2006) 
slip op 14–5. See discussion in Werner and Kim, above n 48. 
109  [1897] 2 QB 57.  
110  In McFadzean, the Victorian Court of Appeal awarded aggravated damages in a claim based on the rule 
in Wilkinson v Downton but refused to award exemplary damages in all the circumstances. The Court 
nevertheless acknowledged the possibility of an award of exemplary damages in such a case: McFadzean 
(2007) 20 VR 250, 286–8. For discussion of the restrictions on the availability of exemplary and 
aggravated damages in tort law reform legislation in Australian jurisdictions, see below Part III(G). 
111  [1897] 2 QB 57, 58. The principles of Wilkinson v Downton were adopted and applied in the High Court 
of Australia in Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1, though there, the plaintiff was unsuccessful.  
112  Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471. 
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behaviour and threatening conduct by defendants, causing post-traumatic stress 
disorder.113 
The notion of ‘calculation’ to cause harm on the part of the defendant has 
been problematic: what is the nature of the defendant’s intent required to ground 
a claim and how objectively is it to be determined? Wilkinson v Downton 
suggests that once the level of likelihood of harm is recognisable in relation to an 
act, that act is ‘calculated’, on an objective view, to cause the harm and therefore 
intention can be imputed to the defendant. It is this notion of ‘calculation’ with 
its imputed intention to cause harm that distinguishes this tort from negligent acts 
resulting in physical harm through mental distress.
 
In Carrier v Bonham,114 a 
majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal held that the concept of an act 
'calculated to cause harm' enunciated in Wilkinson v Downton imported a purely 
objective test which meant that the deluded mental state of the particular 
defendant in that case was irrelevant. In Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust,115 
the English Court of Appeal held that conduct ‘calculated’ to cause harm would 
need to be such that the harm is ‘likely to result’.116 In the NSW Court of Appeal, 
in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu,117 Spigelman CJ held that ‘calculated’ 
means more than ‘reasonably foreseeable’ though it may not have to constitute a 
‘substantial certainty’.118 Chief Justice Spigelman held in that case that the 
defendant’s acts amounted to ‘a reckless indifference to result’ so that they were 
clearly ‘calculated’ to cause harm.119 His Honour referred to ‘the nature and scale 
of [the defendant’s] … conduct [which] was such … as to constitute a recognised 
psychiatric injury as a natural and probable consequence of that course of 
conduct’.120 It is hard to imagine a situation of trafficking or slavery where the 
actions or threats of a defendant would not meet this threshold.121 
Unlike the position in the US,122
 
in Australia and other common law 
countries, the courts have not been prepared to allow recovery for mental distress 
without actual injury (which may be a psychiatric injury). The reason for this 
refusal is undoubtedly the fact that the cause of action in Wilkinson v Downton is 
an action on the case and therefore actual damage is the gist of the action. This 
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issue has been considered by both English123 and Australian124 courts in recent 
years and in both jurisdictions the courts have firmly held that a plaintiff cannot 
recover under the cause of action in Wilkinson v Downton unless he or she has 
suffered actual damage: in cases of mental harm, that must be a recognised 
psychiatric illness.  
The High Court of Australia briefly referred to the action in Wilkinson v 
Downton, in obiter, in Magill v Magill, where Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ 
stated that ‘developments in Anglo-Australian law recognise these cases as early 
examples of recovery for nervous shock, by reference to an imputed intention to 
cause physical harm, a cause of action later subsumed under the unintentional 
tort of negligence’.125  
So, there may be some doubt about the long term survival of the cause of 
action in Wilkinson v Downton, at least where the intention of the defendant to 
cause harm is something less than a deliberate attempt to harm the plaintiff. In 
such a case, a suit in negligence may be a preferred action. But where a 
defendant’s act is a deliberate attempt to harm the plaintiff psychologically, then 
the Wilkinson v Downton cause of action provides a particularly apposite and 
useful remedy.126 Chief Justice Spigelman in the NSW Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the comments of Gleeson CJ in Magill v Magill but nevertheless 
held ‘that [the Court of Appeal] should follow the acceptance by the High Court 
of the authority of Wilkinson v Downton in Bunyan v Jordan and in the joint 
judgment in Northern Territory v Mengel’.127 
The cause of action on the case for the intentional infliction of psychiatric 
injury, first recognised by the common law in Wilkinson v Downton, would 
therefore provide a remedy in cases of human trafficking or slavery where the 
actions of a defendant could be shown to have been deliberately carried out with 
the intention of causing harm to the victim who has suffered a diagnosed 
psychiatric injury. In most instances of trafficking and slavery, victims have been 
coerced into service by the use of threats of various kinds: of physical force to 
themselves or of harm to their families in a home country or of apprehension by 
immigration or other authorities, or of imprisonment or deportation. Those 
threats would, on any objective view, demonstrate an imputed intention to harm 
the victims. 
 
E   The Tort of Deceit 
Victims of trafficking and slavery are induced to cross national borders or to 
travel with a trafficker to a place where they are to be exploited, by deception as 
to job prospects or the nature and conditions of the anticipated employment or 
                                                 
123  Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] 3 All ER 932; Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. 
124  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
125  Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551, 589.  
126  For a discussion of the ‘interesting future’ of the cause of action in Wilkinson v Downton, see Penelope 
Watson, ‘Searching the Overfull and Cluttered Shelves: Wilkinson v Downton Rediscovered’ (2004) 23 
University of Tasmania Law Review 264. 
127  Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 471, 486-7. 
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the financial rewards available at the destination. Further deceptions about the 
dire consequences of leaving employment or the existence of a large debt are 
usually employed by those who subsequently enslave or exploit victims. The tort 
of deceit128 will offer a remedy in many of these circumstances and would enable 
recovery of economic loss as well as compensatory damages for personal injury 
and property damage and even aggravated and exemplary damages.129  
In order to succeed in a claim for deceit a plaintiff will have to establish that 
the defendant knowingly or recklessly made a false representation of fact, by 
words or conduct, intending to induce the plaintiff to act on the representation 
and that the plaintiff did so act, thereby suffering actual damage,130 which may be 
purely financial or physical or psychiatric. The tort of deceit was developed 
largely to protect commercial and property interests of plaintiffs131 and has now 
been somewhat dormant in this arena since the advent of trade practices and 
consumer protection legislation,132 which provide remedies for the kinds of 
claims that would previously have found a remedy in deceit. Nevertheless, the 
tort of deceit remains a useful cause of action and is certainly one which would 
offer a remedy to victims of trafficking and slavery in appropriate cases. 
The most recent High Court consideration of the tort of deceit was in 2006 in 
the case of Magill v Magill.133 The case was a novel claim in deceit in a family 
law context where the tort had apparently not been relied upon in the past in 
Australia.134 The High Court dismissed the appeal by a man who had claimed that 
his former wife's deceit as to the paternity of two children born during their 
marriage, was actionable to enable him to recover damages, being the child 
support that he had paid in respect of the children as well as pain and suffering 
resulting from a depressive illness. The High Court considered that on the 
evidence adduced, all the elements of the tort had not been made out and further 
that significant social policy considerations mitigated against allowing such a 
claim in a marital context, particularly given the ‘no fault’ premise upon which 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is based. 
                                                 
128  The modern tort of deceit is generally acknowledged to have been first recognised in Pasley v Freeman 
(1789) 100 ER 450: J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (Lawbook, 9th ed, 1998) 694–5. 
129  James v Hill [2004] NSWCA 301 (17 September 2004). 
130  Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; Tresize v National Australia Bank Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 706; Pasley 
v Freeman (1789) 100 ER 450; Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337; Bradford Third Equitable Benefit 
Building Society v Borders [1941] 2 All ER 205.  
131  See Sir John Salmond, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries 
(Stevens & Haynes, 1907). See comments of Gleeson CJ in Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551, 562 
referring to the ‘business context in which the action on the case for deceit emerged and in which it had 
and still has a natural place’. 
132  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 ch 2 pt 2-1 s 18 prohibits misleading or deceptive 
conduct in trade or commerce and liability for breach is strict. A wide range of remedies is included in pt 
5-2, in particular, s 237 which provides for compensation orders for persons who suffer loss or damage as 
a result of conduct in contravention of the relevant provisions. 
133  (2006) 226 CLR 551; Lisa Young, ‘Sex Lies and Money: The High Court Considers Deceit and Paternity 
Fraud in Magill v Magill’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 1; Lisa Young and Stephen Shaw, ‘Magill v 
Magill: Families and Deceit’ (2005) 19 Australian Journal of Family Law 44. 
134  There is an English case where the claim was allowed: P v B (Paternity: Damages for Deceit) [2001] 1 
FLR 1041. 
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The Magill decision is instructive on the usefulness of the cause of action in 
deceit in that the High Court confirmed that the tort would be available as a 
remedy in many situations outside the commercial sphere in which the tort 
originally operated, including even possibly in some domestic circumstances, 
thought the Court left that question open.135 Further, the Court addressed the 
elements of the cause of action and emphasised the necessity for the plaintiff to 
be able to isolate and prove one or more discrete deliberate misrepresentations 
made by the defendant upon which the plaintiff actually relied.136 The plaintiff 
bears the onus of proving that the representations relied upon were material and 
that the plaintiff was induced to rely upon them.137 
In a trafficking case this means that the plaintiff will have to adduce evidence 
of the promises made or lies told by the defendant and of the fact that the plaintiff 
specifically relied on those promises or lies, not other information, to his or her 
detriment. In many cases of trafficking or slavery, the only evidence of these 
matters will be the plaintiff's own testimony, without the benefit of corroboration. 
In addition to establishing the fact of the representations and the plaintiff's 
reliance on them, the plaintiff will also have to establish a causal connection 
between the plaintiff's damage and the false representations made by the 
defendant. A difficulty of this aspect is demonstrated by Magill, where the High 
Court failed to find a sufficient connection between the false misrepresentation 
made in that case and the plaintiff’s depressive illness, which was caused by 
other additional circumstances. In trafficking and slavery cases there will usually 
be many circumstances which have contributed to a plaintiff’s loss, particularly 
where the damage includes a psychiatric injury which medical evidence may 
attribute to several causes or events which may have been ongoing for a 
significant period of time. These may be obstacles to a claim in deceit. 
Success in a claim for deceit will require that the evidence allow for an 
inference that the plaintiff’s damage flowed directly from the plaintiff’s reliance 
on the defendant’s false misrepresentation.138 There is some uncertainty in 
Australian law as to the test for remoteness of damage in the tort of deceit: 
whether there is an element of reasonable foreseeability or whether the plaintiff’s 
loss must simply be the direct result of the defendant’s misrepresentation. The 
High Court in Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd139 held that a 
plaintiff’s damages in a claim for deceit would extend to ‘all the consequential 
loss directly flowing from his reliance on the representation ... at least if the loss 
is foreseeable’.140 However in Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons,141 
                                                 
135  Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551, 574–5 (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ), 622–3 (Heydon J 
dissenting). 
136  Ibid 56–9 (Gleeson CJ), 594 (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ), 596 (Hayne J). 
137  Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215, 236 (Wilson J). 
138  Clark v Urquhart [1930] AC 28, 58 (Lord Atkin) cited in Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551, 568 
(Gleeson CJ); see also Aldersea v Public Transport Corporation [2001] VR 499, 507 [44] where a 
plaintiff recovered damages for personal injury in a deceit claim arising out of events concerning the 
termination of the plaintiff’s employment. 
139  (1986) 160 CLR 1, 12 (Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ). 
140  Ibid 12 (Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ). 
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Gummow J took the view that the notion of reasonable foreseeability was not 
relevant to the issue of damage in such a case.142 
The remedies available in a deceit claim extend to damages for economic loss 
as well as damages for personal injury and property damage.143 Damages for 
pecuniary loss have been the common pursuit in claims in deceit as the tort has 
historically been used in commercial contexts. A victim of trafficking might be 
well advised to rely on the tort of deceit, where the elements of the tort can be 
satisfied, in order to recover damages for the pecuniary losses incurred as a result 
of the unpaid work by the plaintiff, particularly in situations of sexual servitude 
where the plaintiff could arguably seek to recover not only ‘wages’ unpaid but all 
moneys including ‘profit’, generated as a direct result of the false representation 
on which the plaintiff relied. The argument would be that these moneys were 
‘lost’ by the plaintiff as a direct result of reliance on the defendant. In deceit 
cases where a plaintiff has been induced to purchase a business because its value 
has been misrepresented, the measure of damage has been the difference between 
the actual value of the business and the price the plaintiff paid.144 Arguably, the 
‘actual value’ of the plaintiffs loss in cases of sexual servitude or extreme labour 
exploitation would include the whole value of the plaintiff’s work, that is the 
‘profit’ generated, not simply the wages lost. 
There may in some instances be an overlap between the tort of deceit and the 
action in Wilkinson v Downton where a defendant’s false misrepresentations are a 
cause of the plaintiff’s psychiatric injury and where the defendant’s conduct can 
be shown to have been calculated to cause the psychiatric injury. The same 
conduct may also ground an action in deceit where the defendant’s conduct can 
be shown to have been intended to induce the plaintiff to act in a particular way 
to his or her detriment.  
 
F   Unlawful Means Conspiracy 
The tort of conspiracy by unlawful means is an action on the case that was 
developed to provide a civil remedy to a person who is harmed as the result of a 
conspiracy of two or more persons which involves the commission of an 
unlawful act, where the conspirators intend to harm the plaintiff’s trade, business 
or other economic interests,145 though that need not be the dominant purpose of 
the conspiracy.146 The cause of action is one of the so called “economic torts”147 
and was developed in the sphere of industrial law148 and competition law149 to 
                                                                                                                         
141  (2001) 208 CLR 388. 
142  Ibid 408. This is the view of the English courts: see Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] 
AC 254. 
143  Gould v Vaggelas (1984) 157 CLR 215; Magill v Magill (2006) 226 CLR 551; Aldersea v Public 
Transport Corporation [2001] VR 499. 
144  Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158, 167 (Denning MR). 
145  Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30, 78 (Fullagher J) and 122 (Menzies J). 
146  Ibid; Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678, 681–2. 
147  John Dyson Heydon, Economic Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 1978). 
148  Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1; Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor Gow & Co [1892] AC 25. 
149  Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495. 
920 UNSW Law Journal Volume 34(3) 
provide a remedy for victims of unlawful acts intended to damage a business or 
some commercial interest.150 But the tort has been developing in recent years to 
provide a remedy in other situations (for example, to enforce a debt).151  
Examining the elements of the cause of action of unlawful means conspiracy, 
it can be concluded that it would provide a remedy for victims of trafficking in 
cases where more than one person had been involved in the trafficking and 
exploitation of the victim by way of criminal or tortious acts. The typical 
trafficking case will involve more than one perpetrator acting together to recruit 
the victim, to obtain travel documents and visas and to transport the victim to a 
place of exploitation. Where this process involves ‘unlawful acts’ such as 
breaches of the criminal law or of immigration laws, or tortious acts including for 
example, trespass to the person of the plaintiff or his or her property, the requisite 
elements of the conspiracy tort can be established.152 The intention of the 
conspirators in such cases is clearly to harm the plaintiff in his or her business or 
commercial interests, given that the plaintiff is being trafficked to work without 
any or at least, proper, payment. Further, the plaintiff suffers actual pecuniary 
loss in the form of the wages or other money he or she should have been paid and 
was no doubt promised.  
The type of unlawful act required to satisfy the elements of the unlawful 
means conspiracy tort has been the subject of some debate,153 though it now 
appears settled that the act may be a criminal act and even a tort.154 Members of a 
trafficking syndicate will have committed at least one of the trafficking related 
offences in the Criminal Code. Further, in trafficking cases there will often be 
visa applications containing false statements or in false names or relying upon 
other falsified immigration documents. The use of such documents would 
constitute offences under the Australian immigration legislation155 and those 
offences would arguably be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the tort of 
                                                 
150  See discussion in Peter Edmundson, ‘Conspiracy by Unlawful Means: Keeping the Tort Untangled’ 
(2008) 16 Torts Law Journal 189; Simon Deakin and John Randall ‘Rethinking the Economic Torts’ 
(2009) 72 Modern Law Review 519; R P Balkin and J L R Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
4th ed, 2009) [21.43]–[21.56]; Peter G Heffey, ‘The Survival of Civil Conspiracy: A Question of Magic or 
Logic’ (1975) 1 Monash University Law Review 136. 
151  Fatimi Pty Limited v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678. 
152  There was a claim for unlawful means conspiracy by the plaintiffs in the English case of AT v Dulghieru 
[2009] 1 All ER (D) 194, though there was no hearing of the substantive claim as to liability. 
153  Sorrell v Smith [1925] AC 700, 716; Galland v Mineral Underwriters Ltd [1977] WAR 116 and 
McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd (1999) 165 ALR 409; all of which held that a 
conspiracy to injure the plaintiff by way of commission of a tort was no more than an example of a case 
of joint tortfeasors and that therefore the claim for the conspiracy was superfluous. 
154  Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30, 78–9; see discussion at Balkin and Davis, above n 150, [21.50]–
[21.54]. 
155  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 234; Criminal Code ss 135.1(1)–135.1(7). In R v Rasalingam (Unreported, 
District Court of New South Wales, Puckeridge DCJ, 2 November 2007) the defendant was convicted of 
an offence of ‘misleading a Commonwealth official in the immigration process’ under the Criminal Code 
s 135.1. 
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unlawful means conspiracy.156 Difficulties arise where the victim/plaintiff has 
also been complicit in any immigration fraud, as is sometimes the situation in 
trafficking cases, where the victim has been schooled in what false information to 
give to immigration authorities.157 Though, in such cases there would no doubt be 
some element of coercion by way of fear of consequences of failure to cooperate, 
on the victim’s part. 
In the recent House of Lords decision Revenue & Customs Commissioners v 
Total Network SL, 158 it was held that even though the criminal conduct of the 
defendants was not independently actionable it was sufficient to ground the tort 
of conspiracy.159 The plaintiff must prove however that the defendants knew that 
their actions were unlawful and that the unlawful acts would cause loss to the 
plaintiff.160 
This cause of action would enable a plaintiff to sue those members of a 
trafficking syndicate who may have had no personal contact with the plaintiff, 
provided they can be identified and joined to the proceedings and provided they 
can be shown to have been aware of and part of the conspiracy. Such an action 
may give a plaintiff legal access to the individuals at the top of the trafficking 
hierarchy and those making the real profit from the enterprise.161 
There is High Court authority to the effect that where conspirators act in 
concert to injure the plaintiff by way of the commission of the same tort that will 
suffice as the unlawful act on which to base a pleading of conspiracy.162 Of 
course, they would also be joint tortfeasors, where they have acted in concert, 
and could be sued as such in tort.163 Where either action would be possible, it is 
doubtful that there would be any advantage in suing in the tort of conspiracy 
rather than in suing joint tortfeasors.164 The measure of damages would be the 
                                                 
156  In Australia, various types of unlawful act have been held to be sufficient to ground an action in 
conspiracy by unlawful means, including breaches of conveyancing legislation and the corporations law 
(Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant (2004) 59 NSWLR 678, 683–5); receiving a secret commission (Coomera 
Resort Pty Ltd v Kolback Securities Ltd [2004] 1 Qd R 1, 37); breach of directors duties (Chen v 
Karandonis [2002] NSWCA 412 (18 December 2002) [28]–[30]). However, Campbell J, at first instance 
in Fatimi Pty Ltd v Bryant [2002] NSWSC 750 (20 September 2002) [193], expressed the view that to 
allow all types of statutory breach to ground an action in tortious conspiracy might be too broad an 
approach. 
157  This was so for the 11 Thai victims who made false claims for refugee status under Australian 
immigration law in R v Netthip [2010] NSWDC 159 (30 July 2010) [10]. 
158  [2008] 1 AC 1174. 
159  For an Australian authority on this point: Dresna Pty Ltd v Misu Nominees Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 1537 (19 
December 2003). 
160  Meretz Investments NV v ACP Ltd [2008] Ch 244. 
161  There may of course be difficulties in enforcing remedies across borders. See discussion below at Part 
IV(G). 
162  Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30, 78–9; see also discussion in Balkin and Davis, above n 150, 
[21.50]–[21.54]. 
163  In Sorrel v Smith [1925] AC 700, 716 Lord Dunedin held ‘if a combination of persons to do what if done 
by one would be a tort, an averment of conspiracy so far as founding a civil action is mere surplusage’. 
This statement has been cited with approval in the High Court in Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130, 143 
(Starke J) and 151 (Williams J) and O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 27. 
164  See J W Neyers, ‘The Economic Torts as Corrective Justice’ (2009) 17 Torts Law Journal 162; Heffey, 
above n 150; Balkin and Davis, above n 150, [21. 52]. 
922 UNSW Law Journal Volume 34(3) 
same. The damages available will include actual pecuniary loss as well as loss of 
earning capacity and in appropriate cases, aggravated and exemplary damages.165 
 
G   Tort Reform Legislation in Australian Jurisdictions  
and Intentional Acts by Defendants 
A distinct advantage to a victim of slavery or trafficking who is considering a 
tortious cause of action is the availability of aggravated and exemplary damages. 
Whilst tort reform legislation166 in various Australian jurisdictions prohibits the 
award of such damages in claims in respect of negligently caused harm, there is 
no such prohibition with regard to claims for deliberate harm,167 except in the 
Northern Territory where no exemplary or aggravated damages may be awarded 
for personal injury.168  
In the early part of the 21st century following a so called ‘insurance crisis’169 
and much public discussion and criticism of the costs associated with tortious 
recovery by accident victims, together with a perception about the capricious 
nature of tortious liability, all Australian jurisdictions enacted some reform of the 
common law,170 though the legislative response was by no means uniform.171 
These reforms were chiefly concerned with aspects of the common law tort of 
negligence and imposed severe limitations on personal injury damages 
recoverable. The reforms across Australian jurisdictions excluded certain causes 
                                                 
165  Latham v Singleton [1981] 2 NSWLR 843, 875–8 (Nagle CJ at CL); Ansett Transport Industries 
(Operations) Pty Ltd v Australian Federation of Air Pilots (No 2) [1991] 2 VR 636. 
166  See Commonwealth, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) [13.165] 
<http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au>, which recommended a provision which would abolish exemplary and 
aggravated damages in respect of negligently caused personal injury. Such a provision was enacted in 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 21, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 52, Personal Injuries (Liabilities 
and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 19 and Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87ZB. The award of 
exemplary damages is also prohibited in NSW by the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 151R in 
respect of workplace injuries and by the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 144 in respect 
of motor accident claims.  
167  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 21; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 52. 
168  Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 19.  
169  See Chief Justice James Spigelman, ‘Negligence: Is Recovery for Personal Injury Too Generous?’ 
(Speech delivered at the 14th Commonwealth Law Conference, London, 14 September 2005). 
170  The reform legislation was based on the recommendations of the Review of the Law of Negligence: Final 
Report , above n 165. 
171  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). 
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of action from the reform legislation172 and in NSW the exclusions included those 
where liability arises from ‘an intentional act that is done by the person with the 
intent to cause injury or death or that is sexual assault or other sexual 
misconduct’.173 So in NSW, a plaintiff’s claim in respect of one of the trespass 
torts or indeed in respect of any deliberate wrongdoing will not be subject to the 
very significant restrictions on personal injury compensatory damages imposed 
by Part 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). The prohibition on the award of 
exemplary, punitive and aggravated damages in section 21 of the NSW 
legislation would not apply either. That applies in respect of negligent conduct 
alone.174 In Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia the position is similar to 
that in NSW.175 
In NSW, any claim which might be brought by a victim of trafficking or 
slavery, whether it is in respect of extreme labour exploitation or sexual 
exploitation, would be covered by the exception. The exclusion from the tort 
reform legislation of civil liability amounting to sexual assault is explicit. In all 
other cases the conduct of the trafficker or persons imposing conditions of 
slavery will be deliberate intentional conduct carried out with the intent to cause 
injury to the victim, or at the very least with reckless indifference as to whether 
injury will result.176 The intention requirement for causation of injury, including 
psychological injury, in tortious causes of action will be satisfied where the 
intention can be imputed to the defendant having regard to all the circumstances 
in which the conduct takes place. In McCracken v Melbourne Storm Rugby 
League Football Club,177 Hulme J held that an illegal ‘spear tackle’ during a 
rugby league match was intentional and done with intent to cause injury to the 
plaintiff so that section 3B(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) operated 
to remove the plaintiff’s claim for damages from the restrictions imposed by the 
Act. His Honour relied upon the evidence in a video recording of the incident to 
infer the requisite intention. In cases of trafficking and slavery, the requisite 
                                                 
172  In South Australia, the legislation applies only to accidents caused wholly or in part by negligence (Civil 
Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 51(a)(ii)(A)) or some other unintentional tort (Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 
51(a)(ii)(B)). In Queensland, the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) applies to ‘any civil claim for damages for 
harm’ (s 4(1)) so that apparently the intentional torts are not excluded though it has been argued that the 
relevant provisions can be interpreted otherwise: Tina Cockburn and Bill Madden, ‘Intentional Torts to 
the Person, Compensation for Injury and the Civil Liability Acts – Recent Cases and Contemporary 
Issues’ (2007) 18 Insurance Law Journal 1. Similar approaches apply in Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT) s 93 and Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 4(1). Provisions in Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 3B(1)(a) and Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 28C(2)(a), 28LC(2)(a) and Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 3A(1) all take an approach similar to the NSW legislation excluding 
intentional acts done with intent to cause injury. 
173  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 3B(1)(a).  
174  A similar prohibition exists in the Northern Territory: Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) s 19; and Queensland: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 52. 
175  Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 3B(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 28C(2)(a), 28LC(2)(a); Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) s 3A(1). 
176  New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168, 172 [33], [43] (Spigelman CJ), 175 [129] (Ipp JA). 
177  [2005] NSWSC 107 (22 February 107). There was an appeal on other issues relating to negligence and 
assessment of damages. 
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intention will have to be imputed from the victim’s evidence as to the conduct of 
the perpetrator. 
The NSW provision excluding claims in respect of intentional acts from the 
operation of the Civil Liability Act 2002 comprises two elements: first, an 
intentional act on the part of the defendant and secondly, an intention on the 
defendant’s part to cause injury to the plaintiff. A literal reading of the section 
would make a claim in respect of an intentional act done without intention to 
cause injury, subject to all the provisions in the legislation including the 
restrictions on damages recoverable. But the trespass torts are actionable per se: 
there is no requirement to prove any actual or even intended injury apart from an 
intention to interfere with the plaintiff’s rights. In cases where there has been no 
actual physical or psychological injury to a plaintiff, the NSW courts have 
adopted a broad definition of the term “injury” used in section 3B(1)(a) of the 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). In Houda v New South Wales,178 a claim in 
respect of a wrongful arrest where the plaintiff claimed false imprisonment and 
assault, Cooper AJ held that ‘injury’ was not confined to physical injury.179 His 
Honour held that the police constable in that case acted with the intent to injure 
the plaintiff in the sense of depriving him of his liberty, forcefully restraining 
him, humiliating him and causing him emotional upset. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff’s claim was excluded from the operation of the Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW). This construction of the section was affirmed in the NSW Court of 
Appeal in New South Wales v Ibbett180 where Spigelman CJ, referring to the 
decision in Houda, held that the term “injury” in section 3B(1)(a) would include 
the harm of an apprehension of physical violence.181 In the same case Ipp JA held 
that the term included anxiety or stress182 and Basten JA held it was not restricted 
to personal injury.183 
In cases founded on a defendant’s conduct which amounts to trafficking or 
slavery, there is little doubt that the claim would not be subject to the restrictions 
on damages in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) because there would always be 
at least an imputed intention to cause some injury to the plaintiff. Even where the 
only injury proved or intended was emotional distress or humiliation or 
deprivation of human rights not amounting to physical injury, the plaintiff’s 
claim in the trespass torts would not come within the limiting provisions of the 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Given that the provisions in Tasmania, Victoria 
and Western Australia184 are similar to the NSW provision excluding deliberate 
acts from the tort reform legislation, the position with respect to claims in 
trafficking and slavery cases in those states would be the same as in NSW.  
                                                 
178  [2005] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-816 (‘Houda’). 
179  Ibid [346]. 
180  (2005) 65 NSWLR 168. There was an appeal to the High Court on other issues: New South Wales v Ibbett 
(2006) 229 CLR 638. 
181  New South Wales v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168, 171. 
182  Ibid 175. 
183  Ibid 184. 
184  Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 3B(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 28C(2)(a), 28LC(2)(a); Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) s 3A(1). 
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H   Aggravated and Exemplary Damages 
As trafficking and slavery are such contemptible abuses of human rights, 
victims would be well advised to pursue aggravated and exemplary damages 
awards in any claims against perpetrators.  
Aggravated damages are a form of general damages awarded to compensate a 
plaintiff who has been treated in a ‘high handed, malicious, insulting or 
oppressive way’185 or who has been subjected to humiliation186 and emotional 
distress.187 Aggravated damages are provided by way of compensation for injury 
which may be intangible, resulting from the circumstances and manner of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.188 Exemplary damages are punitive damages. Whereas 
aggravated damages focus on the humiliation and emotional distress of the 
plaintiff, exemplary damages focus on the reprehensible conduct of the defendant 
and are awarded as retribution and deterrence.189 In the context of a trafficking or 
slavery case, these types of damages are an appropriate, indeed crucial, 
consideration for plaintiff’s lawyers and the courts. 
The English High Court has made an award of exemplary damages in one 
case of a tortious claim by victims against their traffickers. That decision is 
instructive for Australian lawyers and courts, although Australian law as to the 
nature and purpose of exemplary damages190 differs in important major respects 
from the English position.191 
 
I   The English Case: AT v Dulghieru 
In the English case of AT v Dulghieru,192 four young female Moldovan 
victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation obtained a judgment against two of 
their traffickers in the tortious cause of action of unlawful conspiracy, though the 
facts establishing the conspiracy would also have established the several torts of 
deceit, assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the action on the case in 
Wilkinson v Downton, discussed above. The judgment of Treacy J was delivered 
following a hearing for assessment of damages at which there was no appearance 
by or on behalf of the defendants. It is not evident from the judgment how 
                                                 
185  Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027. 
186  Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 8. 
187  New South Wales v Corby (2010) 76 NSWLR 439, 449. 
188  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 646. 
189  Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71, 81 (Isaacs J). 
190  See, eg, Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Limited (1966) 117 CLR 118. 
191  See, eg, Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129.  
192  [2009] EWHC 225 (QB) (19 February 2009) (‘Dulghieru’). 
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liability issues had been resolved, as there is no reference to any hearing, though 
apparently the plaintiffs had obtained summary judgment.193 
The four plaintiffs were awarded a total of £601 000 in damages comprising 
compensatory damages for psychiatric injury, the periods of false imprisonment, 
pain and suffering and loss of amenity due to sexual abuse, as well as aggravated 
damages and exemplary damages. The plaintiffs had been tricked into travelling 
from Moldova to London on the promise of work as dancers. Until they escaped, 
they were treated in a vile manner by their traffickers and had been subjected to 
the most degrading and cruel treatment for periods of one or two months during 
which they were kept imprisoned in a basement flat and forcibly taken to brothels 
to work.  
The judgment deals carefully with the questions of when in English law, 
aggravated and exemplary damages are appropriate and the relationship between 
the two. Justice Treacy was at pains to demonstrate that the plaintiffs were not 
being compensated twice for the same injuries and that the defendants, who were 
serving substantial prison terms, were not being punished twice for their unlawful 
behaviour. 
Justice Treacy held that an award of aggravated damages was appropriate in 
the case because: 
the behaviour of the Defendants amounted to insulting and arrogant treatment of 
these claimants, trampling, as it did, upon their rights as autonomous human 
beings and subjecting them to repeated episodes of degrading non consensual 
sexual activity over a significant period of time.194 
His Honour held that the psychiatric harm, which was included in the award 
of general damages, should be distinguished from ‘the injury to feelings, 
humiliation, loss of pride and dignity and feelings of anger or resentment caused 
by the actions of the Defendants’195 and that it was this later injury that should be 
the subject of the award of aggravated damages, which are compensatory in 
nature rather than punitive.  
On the issue of exemplary damages, the judgment in Dulghieru creates some 
uncertainty about the function of these damages in England: are they punitive or 
do they have a restitution purpose? Justice Treacy referred to Rookes v 
Barnard,196 in particular Lord Devlin’s second category of case in which 
exemplary damages may be awarded, namely where ‘a Defendant with cynical 
                                                 
193  Tsachi Keren-Paz refers to email correspondence with the plaintiff’s solicitors in which it was disclosed 
that the first defendant had filed a defence whilst the second did not defend. Summary judgment was 
ordered against both defendants: Tsachi Keren-Paz, ‘AT v Dulghieru – Compensation for Victims of 
Trafficking, But Where is the Restitution?’ (2010) 18 Torts Law Journal 87, 89. See also Tsachi Keren-
Paz, ‘An Essay on Banalization of Slavery, Devaluation of Sex-Workers Labour and Deprivation of 
Victims of Trafficking’ (Working Paper, Concord Research Institute for Integration of International Law 
Israel, 2009) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980075>. See also Anne O’Driscoll, 
‘AT v Dulghieru: Accounting for the Profits of Sex Trafficking’ (2010) 40 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 695. 
194  Dulghieru [2009] EWHC 225 (QB) (19 February 2009) [59]. 
195  Ibid [57]. 
196  [1964] AC 1129. 
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disregard for a claimant’s rights has calculated that money to be made out of his 
wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk’.197 Justice Treacy also 
held that the rationale for this second category of case where exemplary damages 
might be awarded is ‘not the punishment of the Defendant but the prevention of 
his unjust enrichment’.198 Accordingly, on the basis that the defendants had 
deliberately disregarded the plaintiffs rights in order to make a very significant 
profit for themselves, which would be far beyond any sum that might 
subsequently be recovered by the claimants in any legal process, Treacy J 
awarded a sum of £60 000 by way of exemplary damages to be divided equally 
amongst the four claimants. His Honour considered that this rationale of 
prevention of unjust enrichment also justified the making of the award for 
exemplary damages even though the defendants had been prosecuted 
successfully under the criminal law, because the criminal prosecution did not 
result in any compensation order for the claimants.199 There had also been 
confiscation orders made in the criminal proceedings but Treacy J held that such 
orders did not preclude an award of exemplary damages, again having regard to 
the rationale behind awarding exemplary damages being the prevention of unjust 
enrichment.200 
 
J   The Australian Approach to Exemplary Damages 
The way in which Treacy J treated the question of exemplary damages in this 
case is markedly different from the approach which would be taken by an 
Australian court, given High Court authority on the nature and purpose of 
exemplary damages. The High Court of Australia has expressly rejected the 
House of Lords approach in Rookes v Barnard concerning the restricted 
circumstances in which exemplary damages will be awarded in Uren v John 
Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd201 and Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren. 202 The 
High Court has held that exemplary damages may be awarded where a 
defendant's conduct is ‘high-handed, insolent, vindictive or malicious or had in 
some other way exhibited a contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights’.203 
The High Court has stressed that there must be evidence of positive conduct on 
the part of the defendant ‘in contumelious disregard of another's rights’204 before 
an award of exemplary damages would be made. Exemplary damages have been 
awarded in many different tortious causes of action in Australia including in 
some of the causes of action discussed above, namely deceit,205 conspiracy,206 
                                                 
197  Dulghiery [2009] EWHC 225 (QB) (19 February 2009) [67]. 
198  Ibid [68], relying on Borders (UK) Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 187 (3 
March 2005) [26] (Sedley LJ). 
199  [2009] EWHC 225 (QB) (19 February 2009) [71]. 
200  Ibid [68], referring to Borders (UK) Ltd v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2005] EWCA Civ 187 (3 
March 2005) [26] (Sedley LJ). 
201  (1966) 117 CLR 118. 
202  (1966) 117 CLR 185. 
203  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 CLR 118, 129 (Taylor J). 
204  Ibid 154 (Windeyer J). 
205  Musca v Astle Corporation Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 251. 
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battery207 and false imprisonment.208 The High Court has held that an award of 
both aggravated and exemplary damages is permissible and does not amount to a 
‘double punishment’ where the quantum of each is not excessive, because the 
two are different in kind.209  
In Australia, the High Court has explicitly held that the purpose of exemplary 
damages is to punish and deter a defendant.210 There is no Australian authority to 
suggest that another rationale might be to prevent the defendant's unjust 
enrichment or to provide a form of restitution to a plaintiff. Further, High Court 
authority demonstrates that an award of exemplary damages, where a defendant 
has already been convicted or is likely to be convicted and punished in respect of 
a criminal offence arising from the same events in respect of which exemplary 
damages are sought, may be unjust: a double punishment. In such cases the High 
Court has held that a trial judge should not award exemplary damages. Justice 
Kirby has held that in such circumstances because the object of exemplary 
damages is to punish a defendant, a court must take into account the fact that the 
defendant has already been punished by conviction.211  
There is a further related question as to the effect of an order for confiscation 
of a defendant’s assets as proceeds of crime pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 (Cth) on the issue of exemplary damages. Given that the Australian 
courts are inclined to regard a criminal conviction as a significant factor 
weighing against an award of exemplary damages, it is perhaps unlikely that 
exemplary damages would be awarded where a defendant’s assets had been 
confiscated as proceeds of crime, on the basis that the result would be a double 
punishment. This was an issue in Dulghieru though there the Judge held that the 
confiscation did not preclude an award of exemplary damages because the profits 
made by the defendants at the expense of their victims had been far in excess of 
the sums confiscated and that the defendants would not be ‘mulcted in the same 
sum twice’.212 In Australia the problem would be overcome if the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (Cth) were amended to allow confiscated assets to be available 
to satisfy an award of exemplary damages in favour of a victim, thereby 
overcoming the ‘double punishment’ argument. 
It appears therefore that in Australia, exemplary damages will be available in 
a case where a tortious remedy is sought by a victim of trafficking or slavery, 
except where the defendant has already been or is likely in the future to be 
convicted of a criminal offence or possibly where assets have been confiscated as 
proceeds of crime. The measure of the exemplary damages in Australia will not 
be a sum to provide restitution to the plaintiff in respect of unjust enrichments 
                                                                                                                         
206  Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30. 
207  Henry v Thompson [1989] 2 Qd R 412. 
208  AW v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 543 (5 July 2005). For commentary, see Cockburn and Madden, 
above n 172. 
209  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, 648. 
210  XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448, 470. 
211  Gray v Motor Accident Commission (1998) 196 CLR 1, 33–4 (Kirby J). 
212  Dulghieru [2009] EWHC 225 (QB) (19 February 2009) [73]. 
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obtained by a defendant. Rather, it will be a sum deemed by the court to be a 
suitable punishment for the defendant's conscious and contumelious disregard for 
the plaintiff's rights: in trafficking cases, the basic human rights of the plaintiff. 
The question is whether Australian courts might be prepared to look to the unjust 
enrichment by the trafficker – the profit made at the expense of the plaintiff – as 
a means of quantifying the exemplary damages in order to punish the 
defendant.213  
Further, it might be argued that in trafficking and slavery cases where a 
defendant has been convicted of a criminal offence, that fact should not be a bar 
to an award of exemplary damages but rather one factor to be weighed in the 
assessment of what might be a suitable quantum of exemplary damages; given 
that in trafficking and slavery cases defendants will commonly have made 
substantial profits at the expense of the most outrageous deprivation of their 
victims' human rights. 
The common law of tort provides some valuable opportunities for victims of 
trafficking and slavery to pursue remedies and compensation from the 
perpetrators of their human rights abuses. The availability of aggravated and 
exemplary damages makes the common law a particularly suitable avenue for 
redress because of the punitive and deterrent effects of such damages awards. 
Yet, for many victims, the pursuit of a claim in tort may present considerable 
challenges, which are the focus of the following discussion. 
 
IV   OBSTACLES TO TORTIOUS CLAIMS 
A   Availability of Timely Pro Bono Legal Advice 
One of the major obstacles to victims of trafficking and slavery instituting 
claims for compensation is the obvious difficulty of the availability of legal 
advice,214 which of necessity, must be on a pro bono basis. Victims who are 
identified in the community or by Australian police or immigration authorities 
are generally referred to one of several non-government organisations who offer 
practical assistance and support.215 Whilst those organisations may flag the 
availability of legal advice, victims who are traumatised by their experiences may 
not avail themselves of the opportunity. Research shows that trafficked women in 
                                                 
213  See discussion of the relationship between restitutionary and exemplary damages in the context of a 
‘proprietary tort’ in Andrew Phang and Pey-Woan Lee, ‘Restitutionary and Exemplary Damages 
Revisited’ (2003) 19 Journal of Contract Law 1. See generally, Michael Tilbury, ‘Reconstructing 
Damages’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 697. There is also the possibility of the equitable 
remedy of an account for profit in cases of unjust enrichment: Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 
268; Sarah Worthington, ‘Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 218. 
214  Law Council of Australia, above n 51. 
215  NGOs include the Anti-Slavery Project at the University of Technology Sydney, Australian Red Cross, 
Salvation Army, Sisters of St Joseph, Scarlet Alliance, Australian Catholic Religious Against Trafficking 
in Humans, and Project Respect: see Anti-people Trafficking Interdepartmental Committee, Parliament of 
Australia, Trafficking in Persons: The Australian Government Response 1 May 2009 – 30 June 2010 
(2010) 39. 
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particular, suffer the effects of trauma long after their escape from the situation of 
trafficking and recovery from their physical injuries.216 The lengthy 
psychological recovery process is itself an obstacle to the commencement and 
maintenance of a civil claim. Victims’ fear of facing perpetrators, undergoing 
cross examination and unfamiliarity with the legal process are all factors which 
mitigate against civil claims unless legal advisors are able to offer the most 
sensitive support having regard to cultural background and language difficulties.  
Where a victim does decide to pursue a claim in tort there may well be 
several practical difficulties to be overcome in the prosecution of the claim 
through the courts. These difficulties stem from the problem of identifying 
individual traffickers who would have assets sufficient to satisfy a judgment, who 
are able to be joined to proceedings and served with process. Complex 
arrangements amongst persons involved in trafficking and exploitation lead to 
difficult questions of vicarious liability and agency. The possibility of an order 
for security for costs against an impoverished plaintiff resident outside the 
jurisdiction is a critical problem and there are some evidentiary problems which 
would be common to these types of claims. 
 
B   Discovery before Action: Who Are the Defendants/Conspirators? 
Trafficking schemes are most often multi-tiered in the sense that there are 
various persons involved, at different times and often in different countries, in the 
recruitment, transport and exploitation of a victim.217 This was the situation in 
Tang.218 Obviously there will be severe difficulties encountered by victims’ 
lawyers in identification and process service of traffickers, particularly those who 
are located offshore. A victim will not always be aware of all those who might 
have been complicit in a conspiracy to traffic and enslave: only first names might 
have been used in the victim’s presence or the victim might never have met some 
of the persons involved. The difficulties are obvious and will in some cases 
present a very significant hurdle for a plaintiff who wishes to join all perpetrators 
to civil proceedings, particularly where the ‘deepest pockets’ may reside in those 
individuals at the top of the tier. 
Some of these difficulties might be overcome by the use of preliminary 
discovery and inspection. In NSW for example, the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 2005 (NSW) Part 5 will apply where a plaintiff has made reasonable 
inquiries and is unable to ascertain the identity or whereabouts of a person for the 
purpose of commencing proceedings against that person. In such circumstances 
the plaintiff may make an application to the court for orders that another person, 
having information or possession of documents tending to assist in ascertaining 
the identity or whereabouts of a possible defendant, attend the court to be 
                                                 
216  C Zimmerman et al, ‘Stolen Smiles: A Summary Report on the Physical and Psychological Health 
Consequences of Women and Adolescents Trafficked in Europe’ (Report, London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, 2006).  
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examined or give discovery of documents that are, or have been in the other 
person’s possession, and that relate to the identity or whereabouts of the possible 
defendant. Other Australian jurisdictions have similar procedural rules,219 which 
might assist a victim to identify the more shadowy members of a trafficking 
group. 
 
C   Issues of Multiple Tortfeasors, Vicarious Liability and Agency 
Those perpetrators at the bottom of the tier of responsibility will often have 
the fewest assets available for enforcement of any judgment. However, in labour 
trafficking cases the position may be different. The ultimate employer within 
Australia may be a corporation or an individual with substantial assets. In such 
cases, unscrupulous labour hire contractors may be the traffickers or at least the 
exploiters in the destination country,220 whilst corporations or individuals who 
use workers supplied by these labour hire contractors may have some knowledge, 
or at least prefer not to know, of the situation of trafficked workers. 
If there is an agency relationship between a labour hire contractor and the 
person to whom the labour is supplied then vicarious liability will apply in 
respect of torts committed against the victims of trafficking. In the US, there 
have been some successful claims in cases of labour trafficking against parties 
where a principal and agent relationship has been relied upon.221 Where no 
agency relationship can be established, and that will usually be the case, given 
that an arrangement with a labour hirer will generally be in the nature of an 
independent contract arrangement, the plaintiff’s only option would be to join the 
ultimate ‘employer’ and the labour hire contractor as joint tortfeasors where it 
could be established, on the balance of probabilities, that there was knowledge 
and the requisite imputed intention to commit a tort on the part of the ultimate 
‘employer’.222  
 
D   Plaintiffs Outside the Jurisdiction 
Whilst Australia now has a special trafficking visa framework to assist 
victims of trafficking,223 eventually many victims will return to their home 
countries, either because they are not able to obtain further visas to remain in 
                                                 
219  Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) div 2.8.6; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT) o 32; Supreme Court 
Rules 2000 (Tas) pt 13 div 2A; Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) o 15; Supreme Court (General Civil 
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Supreme Court 1971 (WA) o 26A, r 3. 
220  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Criminal Justice Response to Slavery and People Trafficking’, above n 
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221  See, eg, Does I v Gap Inc (United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, No CV-01-
0031, 10 May 2002) slip op 19–20 where in a trafficking case, agency between a retailer and a 
manufacturer was held to be properly pleaded. See discussion in Werner and Kim, above n 48. 
222  See the discussion regarding labour hire arrangements in Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Criminal 
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Australia or because they prefer to return home to families. Where a plaintiff is 
not able to remain in Australia, there are severe practical difficulties in taking 
legal advice and instructing lawyers. Even the most determined plaintiff and the 
most generous pro bono lawyer will find the dictates of long distance 
communication in a different language extremely difficult. The procedural 
difficulties to be surmounted are numerous. Constant communication with a 
lawyer is essential. There are documents to be signed and served, oral and 
documentary evidence to be marshalled and there are inevitable delays where a 
plaintiff is not present in the jurisdiction.  
There is no Australian visa category which would enable victims to remain in 
or to return to Australia to maintain a civil case against a trafficker. The 
introduction of some type of temporary residence permit to allow victims to 
remain in Australia to initiate and maintain claims for compensation against 
traffickers would be a worthwhile step toward enabling victims to pursue just 
compensation, in accordance with Australia’s international law obligations.224  
 
E   Security for Costs 
A significant difficulty for a civil claimant who is residing outside the 
jurisdiction is the spectre of an order for the payment of security for costs. All 
Australian jurisdictions have civil procedure or court rules pursuant to which a 
court may order that a plaintiff who is ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction 
provide security for costs.225 The purpose of such an order is to ensure recovery 
by a defendant in the event of an adverse outcome of a plaintiff’s case.226 In 
NSW for example, the relevant rule provides that where in any proceedings it 
appears to the court that a plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside NSW, ‘the court 
may order the plaintiff to give such security as the court thinks fit, in such 
manner as the court directs, for the defendant’s costs of the proceedings and that 
the proceedings by stayed until the security is given’.227  
The exercise of the power to order security for costs is discretionary in all 
Australian jurisdictions with the guiding principle being that persons have the 
right to bring and maintain actions to enforce their rights through the courts.228 In 
particular, the courts will be extremely circumspect about ordering security for 
costs where the effect of the order may be to shut a plaintiff out of the litigation 
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process because of poverty.229 The court is required to balance the possible 
injustice to an impecunious plaintiff, whose right to litigate might be stripped 
away, with fair and adequate protection to a defendant in the event that the 
plaintiff’s case is found to be deficient.230 The general principles which the courts 
will consider in deciding whether to exercise the discretion to order security for 
costs include the financial means of the plaintiff,231 the bona fides of the claim,232 
whether an order would stifle the plaintiff’s claim,233 the prospects of success of 
the plaintiff,234 whether the plaintiff’s financial situation is the result of the 
defendant’s conduct,235 whether the plaintiff is resident outside the jurisdiction,236 
whether the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity,237 delay by the 
defendant,238 any public interest in the proceedings,239 and the disparity in the 
resources of the parties.240 Naturally, the relevance of and weight to be afforded 
to the different factors will vary from case to case.  
A victim of trafficking or slavery will obviously be a person of very limited 
financial means and where such a person has returned to a home country, a 
tortious claim may very well be met by an application for security for costs by a 
defendant. In deciding whether to exercise the discretion to order security in such 
a case, the major issues to be weighed by the court will be the plaintiff’s 
impecuniousness and the consequent likelihood that a security for costs order 
will have the practical effect of barring the plaintiff’s claim. This effect has been 
held to be a significant factor in the exercise of the discretion in favour of the 
plaintiff.241 Further it has been held that there is no inflexible rule that an order 
for security for costs ought to be made when a plaintiff is ordinarily resident 
outside the jurisdiction.242  
Certainly, where a plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction, the 
provisions in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) and similar rules 
in other Australian jurisdictions, have the effect of enlivening the court’s power 
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to order security for costs, but the discretion may nevertheless be exercised in 
favour of the plaintiff, as was the case in Corby v Channel Seven Sydney Pty 
Ltd.243 There the plaintiff in defamation proceedings was ordinarily resident 
outside NSW and was without regular income. The Court held that the effect of 
an order for security in the sum sought by the defendant might ‘well prevent the 
plaintiff from continuing to prosecute her claim’.244 Further the court held that 
the delay by the defendant in bringing the application for security and the ‘strong 
financial position of the corporate defendant’245 were factors weighing in favour 
of the plaintiff. Significantly, the court found that the defendant could, if 
necessary, absorb the costs of enforcing a judgment in Bali where the plaintiff 
resided. Finally, the court held that the interests of justice between the parties did 
not require the provision of protection to the defendants in respect of the costs of 
enforcing a judgment overseas.  
The stultification factor, that is the propensity for an order for security to 
preclude the plaintiff’s claim altogether, would surely be given much weight by a 
court where an order for security was sought in a trafficking or slavery case, 
particularly given a plaintiff’s poverty and the likelihood that it was, in large part, 
caused by the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff.  
 
F   Evidentiary Problems: Corroboration, Credibility and Conviction 
In a civil case in tort the plaintiff’s evidence will of course be critical to 
proving on the balance of probabilities all elements of the cause. Unfortunately in 
many trafficking or slavery cases there will be little, if any, corroborative 
evidence available. The search for corroborative evidence would be expensive 
and may be difficult and time consuming. A review of Australian trafficking 
criminal prosecution transcripts, undertaken by the Australian Institute of 
Criminology, revealed that prosecutors had obtained corroborative evidence from 
a number of sources including brothel clients whom trafficked women had asked 
for help, mobile telephone records confirming victim’s movements, financial 
records confirming money transfers, photographs of premises and other 
documentary material.246 There is no reason why a lawyer in a civil case would 
not be able to seek out such evidence, though of course the search may be limited 
by a lack of financial and other resources.  
Issues of the plaintiff’s credibility will almost certainly be raised by a 
defendant and the plaintiff’s lawyer will need to ensure that the victim is allowed 
to explain any prior inconsistent statements that might have been made to 
criminal investigators or immigration authorities or to an organisation that may 
be supporting the victim. According to the Australian Institute of Criminology’s 
research, there have been several Australian trafficking criminal prosecutions 
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where victims had given several statements to investigators that differed in 
significant ways, therefore amounting to prior inconsistent statements.247 There 
are many reasons why a victim might make an incomplete or even false 
statement when first discovered by authorities or when relying on NGO support: 
trauma causing confusion and memory loss, fear of deportation or incarceration, 
and/or fear of retribution by traffickers against victims or their families.  
Leaving aside questions about how any documentary statements might come 
into the hands of defendants, a plaintiff’s lawyer would be well advised to ensure 
that any documentary statements made by a victim are obtained and considered 
for inconsistency and that the plaintiff has an opportunity to explain any such 
inconsistency. The types of statements mentioned above will not be privileged 
and will be admissible on cross-examination on the issue of credibility.248 
An additional evidentiary consideration in a civil claim brought by a victim 
against a trafficker or enslaver is whether a criminal conviction of the defendant 
on a trafficking or slavery or related charge will be admissible at the civil trial. 
Findings of fact in previous proceedings are inadmissible at common law in 
subsequent proceedings, except where an issue estoppel arises between the 
parties.249 There will be no issue estoppels between the parties to a civil claim 
where the previous proceeding was a criminal one.  
In the Northern Territory, Queensland and South Australia by legislation, a 
conviction will be admissible in civil proceedings.250 In proceedings in a federal 
jurisdiction or the ACT, NSW, Tasmania or Victoria, evidence of a decision or a 
finding of fact in a prior proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of 
any fact that was in issue in the prior proceeding.251 Though, in those 
jurisdictions, in civil proceedings evidence of a prior decision will be admissible 
to prove that a party has been convicted of an offence (provided there is no 
appeal pending or the conviction has not been quashed or set aside).252 So, whilst 
a plaintiff will be able to rely on a conviction to prove a slavery or trafficking 
offence by the defendant, any findings of fact in the criminal trial or the 
conviction itself, will not be admissible to prove the facts constituting the 
elements of a tortious cause of action. 
 
G   Pyrrhic Victories: Enforcing Judgments against Traffickers 
A significant potential challenge at the conclusion of a successful case is of 
course, the recovery of the verdict money from the defendant. In some instances, 
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250  Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 26A; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) div 5, ss 78–82; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34A. 
251  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 91(1); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 91(1); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 91(1); 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 91(1).  
252  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 92(2); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 92(2); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 92(2); 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 92(2). 
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defendants in trafficking or slavery cases will have business or personal assets 
which would be available to satisfy a judgment debt but as with other aspects of 
the litigation process, it may be costly and difficult for the plaintiff to pursue a 
defendant determined to avoid payment.  
In cases where there has been a criminal conviction it would be to a victim’s 
advantage if assets of the defendant were confiscated as proceeds of crime and 
then made available to satisfy the victim’s judgment debt or perhaps a reparation 
order pursuant to section 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (Cth) establishes a scheme to trace, restrain and confiscate 
proceeds of Commonwealth crime. At present, the Act provides that confiscated 
funds are to be used for crime prevention, law enforcement, measures relating to 
treatment of drug addiction and diversionary measures relating to illegal drug use 
in Australia.253 Whilst funding has been used to finance various projects to assist 
victims of crime,254 the Act does not allow for confiscated proceeds of crime in 
individual cases to be used to compensate victims or to satisfy civil damages 
judgments in favour of victims. Reform of this aspect of the proceeds of crime 
legislation in Australia would be a measure which would enhance the prospects 
of successful recovery of tortious damages in cases where a criminal prosecution 
had been successful.255 In the UK there is provision for a court to order that 
forfeited asset proceeds be paid to a person who has suffered personal injury or 
damage as the result of an offence256 or where a compensation order has been 
made by the criminal court.257 A provision of this kind in the Australian 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) would be of obvious benefit to victims in 
those cases in which prosecutions are successful.  
 
V   CONCLUSION 
The issue of compensation for victims of trafficking and slavery is crucial, 
especially given Australia’s commitment to human rights and its international 
obligations which include the responsibility to ensure effective remedies for 
victims. The provision of functional and viable pathways to compensation for 
victims should be an essential element of the Australian human rights based 
response to the problem of human trafficking and slavery.  
At present in Australia, the surest way for a victim to recover at least a 
limited amount by way of compensation, is pursuant to one of the Australian 
States’ victims of crime compensation schemes. But the amounts recoverable 
under these schemes are not as generous as the amounts which would be 
available following a successful tortious claim at common law. Nevertheless, for 
                                                 
253  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 298. 
254  Attorney-General’s Department, Overview of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, above n 56. 
255  Calls for reform have been made by the Anti-Slavery Project, University of Technology, Sydney: Anti 
Slavery Project, above n 51. 
256  Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (UK) c 6 s 145. 
257  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (UK) c 29 s 13(6).  
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those victims for whom the difficulties of pursuing a claim at common law are 
insurmountable, the state victims of crime compensation schemes provide a 
viable option for recovery. But these state schemes do not specifically provide 
for compensation in respect of the federal crimes of trafficking and slavery. 
Rather, a victim needs to bring a claim within the parameters set by the state 
schemes. A better solution and one in keeping with Australia’s international 
obligations would be a Commonwealth scheme to compensate victims of federal 
crimes, including human trafficking and slavery crimes. Such a scheme would 
ensure not only Australia’s compliance with its international obligations but 
would constitute recognition by Australia of the need to ensure that the human 
rights of victims are restored. From a human rights perspective, Australia must 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators and support victims, as it does. It must also 
aim for restoration of fundamental human rights, at least by way of adequate 
compensation.  
Tortious remedies have an important role to play in the provision of just 
recompense for victims because they offer the prospect of significant 
compensatory damages as well as aggravated and exemplary damages. The 
tortious causes of action discussed above clearly provide opportunities for 
victims to obtain adequate and proper compensation for the human rights abuses 
they have suffered. Yet, there are inherent difficulties in the commencement and 
maintenance of such claims, including personal issues for traumatised victims 
who may be outside the jurisdiction, the difficulty of identifying and serving 
defendants, evidentiary challenges and the obvious grave problems of recovering 
a judgment debt. At least in the rare cases where the plaintiff’s personal and 
procedural difficulties can be overcome and where the defendant has been 
convicted of a criminal offence, the recovery of a judgment debt could be assured 
where assets of the defendant were confiscated as proceeds of crime and then 
made available to satisfy the victim’s judgment debt. Amendment of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) to allow for confiscated proceeds of crime in 
individual cases to be used to satisfy civil damages judgments in favour of 
victims would not only be of great practical assistance but would be in 
accordance with Australia’s international obligations.  
Tortious causes of action for intentional harm to victims of slavery and 
trafficking certainly provide valuable opportunities for recovery of 
compensation. Lamentably, except in a very few cases, the prospect of recovery 
of substantial damages may well be outweighed by the practical difficulties of 
instituting and maintaining such civil claims and the uncertainty of recovery of a 
judgment debt. Commonwealth legislation to provide compensation to victims 
would be the surest way for Australia to meet its human rights obligations in 
those cases where tortious claims are not feasible. 
 
